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SOLAR ENERGY LAW:
EASEMENTS OF ACCESS TO SUNLIGHT
JOHN WILLIAM GERGACZ*

[Editor'sNote: Solar energy has become an increasingly important
subject for consideration in the United States during the past
decade. This issue of the New Mexico Law Review contains two
articles which discuss the law of solar access: this article on creation
of solar access easements and a student article on the New Mexico
Solar Rights Act which follows.]
INTRODUCTION

Development and use of solar energy systems in this country pose
numerous problems requiring solutions in the future. One area of
difficulty involves economic and technological problems.' Another
involves access rights to sunlight 2 and is the topic of this piece. The
issue of access to sunlight may be divided into two categories. One
category is group access: that is, a number of solar energy users
*Assistant Professor, University of Kansas School of Business; B.S., Indiana University,
Bloomington, Indiana, 1972; J.D., Indiana University, Bloomington, Indiana, 1975. The
author wishes to express special thanks to Joan M. Gergacz for her assistance in critically
editing this article.
1. A major technological problem with present solar systems is adequate storage of the
energy to utilize on an overcast day. Kidder, Tinkering with Sunshine: The Prospects for
Solar Energy, Ad. Monthly, Oct., 1977, at 70; Wolf, Solar Energy Utilization by Physical
Methods, 184 Sci. 382 (April 1974). As a result, solar power systems cannot be expected to
produce the user's entire energy needs. Unless a solar user is willing to risk some powerless
days, (perhaps in the winter when the sky may be overcast for a number of days) a
traditional energy source must also be utilized. This may burden a central utility (and
ultimately its customers) which must retain sufficient capacity to provide for the occasional
customer. Questions arise as to the rates applicable to the occasional customer as well as his
"right" to receive traditional energy at all. Such questions must be reserved for future
articles.
A major economic problem is the high cost associated with some methods of converting
sunlight into electricity. One such process, photovoltaic, developed for use in spacecraft,
directly converts sunlight to electricity. It has been estimated that electricity produced by
such a system would cost twenty to forty times as much as that produced by a conventional
nuclear power system. Id.
2. In a sense we are all solar energy users. Everything around us is in some way derived
from the sun. Our food, the weather and livable climate all are a result of solar energy. See
generally, Wilhelm, Solar Energy, The Ultimate Powerhouse, 149 Nat'l Geographic 381
(Mar. 1976). However, "solar energy" in this paper will be limited to the conversion of
sunlight to useable energy in order to heat and cool buildings, create electricity and do all
other things necessary to enable us to curtail reliance on traditional fuel (coal, oil, gas) or
nuclear fuel.
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banding together perhaps to form a cooperative to share the energy
collected by a central solar energy system. Group access also includes
utility companies collecting sunlight and selling the converted energy
to individual customers.
This article focuses on a second category: access rights of an individual3 who seeks to collect his own sunlight and convert it into
useable energy on a building-to-building basis.4 The problems dis3. The term "individual solar energy user" is not limited to a homeowner even though
many of the problems and cases discussed in this articleconcern adjoining homeowners. The
individual access problems could affect any person or business which does not own either
the adjacent property or an easement for sunlight across it. The term "individual" therefore
will be used in this broader sense. The major characteristic which distinguishes the individual
user from the group user is the fact that the individual user collects the solar energy he uses.
The group user purchases the energy collected by some third party.
Furthermore, many individual solar energy users will not be troubled by access to sunlight issues. Their concern will rest solely with scientists' and engineers' work in developing
efficient, economical and practical solar energy systems. These individual users, such as
universities, factories and farms, would control enough property adjoining the solar collector so that they would also control the access to sunlight necessary for the collector to
function. Large trees might be trimmed or removed. New buildings might be located and
designed so as not to block the sunlight. Perhaps buildings could be constructed underground, as for example, The University of Illinois at Urbana, Illinois, which has its library
underground.
Other individual solar energy users do not have those alternatives. These users do not
control the adjacent property. They will not become individual solar energy users unless an
access to sunlight can be assured. The value of such a system to them cannot depend upon
the acts of their neighbors. First semester property students learn that property consists of a
bundle of legal rights. The value of property often depends upon the existence of that
property's rights. A $100,000 house would most likely tumble in price if tomorrow the legal
right to possession was extinguished. The same concept applies with respect to the prices
paid for property by individual solar energy users. One cannot be expected to invest in a
solar energy system when he does not control the access to needed sunlight.
This is not to deny the fact that pioneers who build solar energy homes and businesses
exist. They should, however, have a keen interest in their legal right to a continuous source
of sunlight.
4. Solar energy systems today may provide for either sequential conversion of sunlight to
useable power or direct conversion of sunlight to useable power. The most typical solar
energy systems are of the sequential conversion type. One such system, a solar heating
system, was discussed in Wilhelm, supra note 2. That solar energy system consists of glassencased pipes and flat metal sheets, painted black, which collect the sunlight. The sheets are
angled in such a way as to capture as much sunlight and absorb as much solar radiation as
possible. Sunlight-heated air or water in the pipes then distributes heat through a duct
system, thereby heating the building. Such a system usually also contains a storage facility.
A major technological problem with solar energy involves development of adequate energy
storage systems in order to provide needed power on overcast days.
Another type of sequential conversion system was discussed in Wolf, supra note 1. Such a
system would convert sunlight to heat, then to steam, then to mechanical power and finally
to electricity.
In addition to sequential conversion of sunlight to electricity, direct conversion methods
have also been developed. One method of conversion is through a photovoltaic process,
another is through photoelectrochemistry. Photovoltaics was first developed for use in the
space program. It was designed so that when certain elements, like silicone, are struck by
sunlight, their electrons are freed from their place in the element's atomic structure. As a
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cussed herein do not affect each individual solar energy user. An
individual who controls sufficient real property adjoining his solar
collector also controls the access of sunlight to that collector. If a
tree blocks the sunlight, this user determines whether it should be
trimmed or removed. If construction of a building is planned, he
determines whether that building should obstruct the sunlight to his
solar collector. Like the property owner adjoining a highway, he is
not as concerned with access rights as is the individual whose property is landlocked.
The basic problem which highlights the access issues to be discussed is as follows: A decides to invest in an individual solar energy
system. He places the collector at the most advantageous location
(the roof of his home) so that it operates at maximum efficiency. A's
property is the typical city or suburban lot. The property adjoining
A's and abutting the side which the solar energy collector faces is
owned by B. The question which arises is what steps A may take in
order to ensure that his solar collector receives the sunlight' which
crosses B's property.
Solar access is not a new legal issue. Although its recent applications concern solar energy collectors, access issues initially concerned
a legal right to sunlight for illumination as it could be collected
through windows and doorways. The central legal issue is the right of
the homeowner to sunlight which invariably flows across his neighbor's property.
The access issue has been analyzed by some of the greatest minds
in American law. Oliver Wendell Holmes struggled with it both as an
attorney6 and as ajudge, 7 as did Story' and Cardozo. 9 This article will
result, an electronic current is generated. Douglas, Solar Electricity: From Dream to
Scheme, 109 Sci. News 316 (May 15, 1976); Kidder, supra note 1; Wolf, supra note 1.
Photoelectrochemistry is another method of direct conversion of sunlight to electricity.
This process may be likened to an ordinary battery whose source of energy is sunlight rather
than a chemical reactant. "[T] wo electrodes are placed in a liquid electrolyte with one
electrode exposed to light, the other left in darkness. When light frees the electrons in one
electrode, they are carried through the external load to the other electrode where they
combine with ions in the electrolyte." Douglas, supra note 4, at 317. A major technological
problem associated with this process involves the degradation of the electrodes and the
electrolyte.
5. For example, since A was the first to erect a solar collector system, will the law
prohibit B from allowing trees to grow, from constructing a building, or from erecting his
own solar energy collector which would obstruct the sunlight to A's collector?
6. Brooks v. Reynolds, 106 Mass. 31 (1870). Holmes was the attorney for the plaintiffappellant who filed an action in tort for the obstruction of light and air easements appurtenant to his land. The court discussed the history of that land: On July 27, 1816, New
Cornhill Corporation conveyed a parcel of land to Hurd, the plaintiff's predecessor in title.
The deed stated that the parcel's southern boundary was "partly on a passageway of five
feet wide in the clear for light and air." Id. at 31. That deed also contained the following
language which is quoted from the opinion.
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It is understood and agreed by the parties aforesaid, that the passageway for
light and air is to be five feet wide on said Hurd's line and two feet eight
inches on Dorset's Lane [to which the passageway ran] and the same is always
to be kept open for the purpose aforesaid, and said Hurd, his heirs or assigns,
to have no other privilege in the same.
Id. at 31.
On September 19, 1816, Hurd, New Cornhill Corporation and Andrews (to whom New
Cornhill Corporation had sold land east of Hurd's parcel and south of the passageway)
entered into an agreement. Since Hurd's property ran from New Cornhill's land to the
passageway, "which is to be kept open for light and air," it was extended four inches
further, into the passageway.
A few days after the original conveyance to Hurd, July 30, 1816, New Cornhill Corporation conveyed another parcel of land abutting the passageway to Cotting. At that time the
fee to the passageway was held by New Cornhill Corporation.
Hurd's parcel subsequently vested in the plaintiff and Cotting's parcel vested in the
defendant. The plaintiffs lawsuit arose when the defendant erected, in the passageway, a
ten foot high structure approximately seventy-five feet from the plaintiffs land. There was
no evidence at trial that the plaintiffs quantity of light and air was in any way diminished.
The case was tried before the bench and the court held for the defendant stating,
"[U] pon the consideration of all the conveyances, that the plaintiff took only the common
law right of air and light, and that the evidence did not show that such right had been
impaired in the case." Id. at 32.
The plaintiff appealed and Holmes made the following successful argument on behalf of
his client:
1) The extent of the easement for light and air will depend upon the construction of the
conveyance to Hurd.
2) Even without proof of actual damages the plaintiff-appellant has an action for nominal damages caused by the permanent obstruction of the easement.
3) "If Hurd took only the common law right of light, any abutter of the passageway
might have built it up after the conveyance to Hurd, as high as the distance from his
building to Hurd's." Id. at 32.
4) Easements are apportionable, and therefore the later conveyance to Hurd of the four
inch strip across the end of the passageway did not affect the easement rights of the
plaintiff-appellant who took title through Hurd's chain of title.
On appeal the court agreed, stating that the extent of the right to light and air that the
plaintiff-appellant might have would depend upon the terms in the deed of the conveyance
to Hurd. The exceptions of Holmes' client were sustained. The court made it clear that, in
Massachusetts, without express words a deed does not pass the right of light and air flowing
across adjoining property.
The court then analyzed the deed and found that it granted to Hurd the right to open and
unobstructed passage of light and air throughout the length of the passageway. The subsequent four inch strip conveyance did not impair or extinguish that right over the rest of the
passageway.
7. The following are Holmes' judicial opinions concerning access to sunlight issues: Ladd
v. City of Boston, 151 Mass. 585, 24 N.E. 858 (1890) concerns mutual covenants contained
in sixty-four lots. Holmes concluded that easements of light and air may be created across
neighboring land in a deed by words of grant or by covenant. Muhlker v. Harlem R.R., 197
U.S. 544, 571 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting) concerned an elevated railway on Park Avenue
in New York City. The plaintiff sought either an injunction against the erection of the
elevated tracks or compensation for the loss of rights (including light and air) which he had
appurtenant to his property.
Prior to the construction of the elevated railway, a surface railway ran in front of the
plaintiff's property along Park Avenue. A portion of the surface railway was in a trench with
three foot high walls on either side. These walls prevented the plaintiff from crossing the
tracks, while the elevated construction impaired his light and air. The lower court was
willing to offset damage to the plaintiff's light and air easements by his increased access
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easement resulting from the removal of the trench and the three foot walls. On appeal, the
Supreme Court disagreed.
To do this, however, is to make one easement depend upon another, both of
which are inseparable attributes of property and equally necessary to its enjoyment. It is impossible for us to conceive of a city without streets, or any
benefit in streets, if the property abutting on them has not attached to it as an
essential and inviolable part, easements of light and air as well as of access.
Ia at 563.
The majority held that it was clear that light and air easements could not be made
dependent upon the easement of access. The court also held that the plaintiff acquired his
property when this rule was clearly the law of the state of New York. The state could not
later use its power to take away the plaintiff's rights (i.e., access to light and air to his
property over an abutting street) which had been acquired by contract without compensation to the plaintiff.
In his dissent, Holmes pointed out that the doctrine that highway abutters have an
easement to light and air over the street arose in New Jersey, where courts were quick to
find the right of access to light and air. Those courts held that a landowner could acquire
such a right by prescription. Holmes added:
To a certain and to an appreciable extent the legislature may alter the law of
nuisance, although property is affected. To a certain and to an appreciable
extent the use of particular property may be limited without compensation.
Not every such limitation, restriction or diminution of value amounts to a
taking in a constitutional sense. I have a good deal of doubt whehter it has
been made to appear that any right of the plaintiff has been taken or destroyed for which compensation is necessary under the Constitution of the
United States.
Id. at 576.
Holmes also responded to the majority's argument in his inimitable style.
The plaintiff's rights, whether expressed in terms of property or of contract,
are all a construction of the courts, deduced by way of consequence from
dedication to and trusts for the purposes of a public street. They never were
granted to him or his predecessors in express words, or, probably, by any
conscious implication. If at the outset the New York courts had decided that
apart from statute or express grant the abutters on a street had only the rights
of the public and no private easement of any kind, it would have been in no
way amazing.
Id. at 572-73.
8. United States v. Appleton, 24 F. Cas. 841 (C.C.D. Mass. 1833) (No. 14,463). Story,
the circuit justice, discussed the rights which passed with a grant. He made the following
analogy in dicta, but it suggests Story's interpretation of one aspect of the access to sunlight
issue.
A man sells a dwellinghouse with windows then looking into his own adjacent
lands. There can be no doubt, that the grant carries with it the right to the
enjoyment of the light of those windows; and that the grantor cannot, by
building on his adjacent land, entitle himself to obstruct the light, or close up
the windows.
Id. at 844.
Later in the opinion Story again refers to the access to sunlight analogy: "Could they
have shut out all the light of the window in the upper part of it? ...In my opinion it is
most clear that they could not." Id. at 844.
9. In re Grand Boulevard and Concourse, 212 N.Y. 538, 106 N.E. 631 (1914). The case
concerned a statute of limitations for making a claim for loss of easements of light and air
held by landowners abutting a street which was discontinued.
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trace the historical development of United States case law concerning
access rights to sunlight, analyze the reasoning given in those cases,
and discuss whether they retain any vitality for solar energy issues
today.1 0 Topics to be discussed are express covenants, 1 1 express
10. The light and air access cases highlight a very difficult problem. On one side is
homeowner A who builds or purchases his home, which is lighted and ventilated naturally
during the day. Homeowner A's complaint focuses on neighbor B who has built a structure
or allowed trees to grow so as to darken the homeowneFs windows and cut off their
ventilation. On the other side of the controversy is neighbor B whose development of his
land is sought to be enjoined merely because of the placement of some windows in A's
home. B's use, and perhaps value, of his land is being restricted by A who has made no use
of B's land, only the light and air passing over it.
This dilemma will also exist where the issue concerns access to sunlight for solar energy
collectors. Yet easement law need not stand alone to protect solar access rights. Some
commentators have suggested zoning as a method of assuring solar access rights. They
discussed the constitutional limits on the legislature's power and suggest that the traditional
zoning concern for light and air for visual aesthetics may be a reasonable precedent for
establishing solar access rights by zoning. Eisenstadt and Utton, Solar Rights and Their
Effect on Solar Heating and Cooling, 16 Nat. Resources J. 363, 379-88 (1976) [hereinafter
cited as Eisenstadt and Utton]. See also Eisenstadt, Long and Utton, A Proposed Solar
Zoning Ordinance, 15 Urb. L. Ann. 211 (1978); Comment, Assuring Legal Access to Solar
Energy: An Overview with Proposed Legislation for the State of Nebraska, 12 Creighton L.
Rev. 567 (1978-1979); Note, Protecting Solar Access: Preventing a Potential Problem, 7
Golden Gate U. L. Rev. 765 (1977); Note, A Legislative Approach to SolarAccess: Tansferable Development Rights, 13 New England L. Rev. 835 (1978).
This article will not explore the zoning alternative. Nor will this article explore "spite
fence" situations in which a neighbor would be precluded from using his land in a certain
manner. Cases containing this issue often arose where one neighbor would construct an ugly
fence near his property line in order to harass his neighbor. Often this fence would obstruct
the flow of light and air to the neighbor's premises.
At common law it was generally accepted that a person could build as he pleased on his
property irrespective of his motive. E.g., Saddler v. Alexander,
Ky.
-,
56 S.W.
518 (1900); Metzger v. Hochrein, 107 Wis. 267, 83 N.W. 308 (1900). Beginning in the late
nineteenth century, however, inroads were made in that doctrine by courts and legislatures.
They denied a person the right to build if his motive was solely to harass his neighbor. E.g.,
Rideout v. Knox, 148 Mass. 368, 19 N.E. 390 (1889); Webb v. Lambley, 181 Nev. 385, 148
N.W.2d 835 (1967). In Rideout, Holmes stated that, at common law, a man had the right to
erect a high fence, but added a qualification:
But it is plain that the right to use one's property for the sole purpose of
injuring others is not one of the immediate rights of ownership. It is not a
right for the sake of which property is recognized by the law, but is only a
more or less necessary incident of rights which are established for very different ends.
Id. at 372, 19 N.E. at 391.
The Rideout case involved a constitutional attack on a Massachusetts spite fence statute.
Holmes stated that such a statute could be passed by the legislature as a constitutional
exercise of its police power; the fence in question was, however, held not to be in violation
of the statute because it was constructed prior to the enactment of the statute. The statute
did not make the construction of such a fence unlawful retroactively.
11. A covenant is an agreement of two or more parties to a deed in writing in which
either of the parties pledges to the other that something is done or shall be done. Black's
Law Dictionary.436 (rev. 4th ed. 1968). In the "access to sunlight" area, covenants may be
imposed to create access to sunlight across adjoining property. This can be accomplished
between adjacent landowners, and where properly drafted, such a covenant will run with the
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easements,' 2 implied easements' " and the prescriptive easement' 4
doctrine. At the outset, the reader should ponder a quotation by
Benjamin N. Cardozo written over fifty years ago.
Property, like liberty, has been taught that some of its most cherished immunities are not absolute, but relative. We shall have to
learn as the years go by to distinguish more and more between what
is essential in the concept of ownership and so invariable under the

land. Bryan v. Gosse, 155 Cal. 132, 99 P. 499 (1909). A covenant that runs with the land so
touches and concerns the land that its benefit (or burden) passes with the transfer of the
land. It is annexed to the land and cannot be transferred separate from the land. Black's
Law Dictionary 438 (rev. 4th ed. 1968). In addition, covenants may run with the land, even
where a large tract containing such covenants is later subdivided. Sain v. Silvestre, 78 Cal.
App. 3d 461, 144 Cal. Rptr. 478 (1978). If a view is unobstructed, it follows that sunlight
from that direction, too, is unobstructed by the covenant. See generally 3 R. Powell, The
Law of Real Property
670-86 (rev. ed. P. Rohan 1979).
12. An easement is a privilege which accrues to the owner of one tract (dominant
tenement) from the land of another tract (servient tenement). The servient tenant is obliged
to refrain from doing something on or in regard to his tract for the benefit or advantage of
the dominant tenement. Examples of easements include a right of way (road) or a water
course which flows upon the servient tenant's estate. Black's Law Dictionary 599 (rev. 4th
ed. 1968); 3 R. Powell, The Law of Real Property 405 (rev. ed. P. Rohan 1979).
"An easement is a privilege without profit which one has for the benefit of his own land
in the land of another." Hasselbring v. Koepke, 463 Mich. 466,
,248 N.W. 869, 873
(1933). An express easement may be created by explicit language in a deed either conveying
or reserving the easement with the grantor. E.g., Hagerty v. Lee, 45 N.J. Eq. 1, 15 A. 399
(Ch. 1888). Further, the easement itself may be created by words of express grant apart
from the conveyance. E.g., Homewood Realty Corp. v. Safe Deposit and Trust Co., 160 Md.
457, 154 A. 58 (1931).
For example, a grantor may convey a portion of his land to a grantee, while reserving an
easement of access to sunlight across the grantee's premises. A grantor may also convey to
the grantee the right for the grantee to receive unobstructed sunlight across the grantor's
property. In either situation an express easement would be created. See generally 3 R.
Powell, supra note 11, at t 4 405-09.
13. An implied easement rests on the theory that when an owner of a tract conveys a
part thereof he also conveys, by implication, easements that are continuous, apparent and
reasonably necessary for the enjoyment of the tract. The grant of such easements is implied
from the facts and circumstances and does not rest upon any specific language in the deed.
Black's Law Dictionary 600 (rev. 4th ed. 1968). E.g., Liedtke v. Lipman, 76 A. 463 (N.J.
Ch. 1910); 3 R. Powell, supra note 11, at T 410-11. Implied easements for sunlight were
applied by some courts during the development of right of access to sunlight law in the
nineteenth century, (e.g., Janes v. Jenkins 34 Md. 1 (1870)), while other courts refused to
apply the doctrine (e.g., Mullen v. Stricker, 19 Ohio St. 135 (1869)).
14. An easement by prescription is acquired by the long-term enjoyment of the easement
by the claimant, his ancestors or grantors. Black's Law Dictionary 600 (rev. 4th ed. 1968).
The concept underlying easement by prescription is based upon one landowner knowingly
acquiescing in another person's claim and enjoyment of an easement for a number of years
without interruption or molestation. Such an adverse use will ripen into a legal right to use
the landowner's property, thereby creating an easement. E.g., Pierre v. Fernald, 26 Me. 436
(1847). See generally 3 R. Powell, supra note 11, at $ 413. In the access to sunlight area, the
question becomes whether a landowner acquires an easement by prescription for sunlight
through the long-term use of that sunlight.
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constitution, and what is accidental or unessential, and so variable
and severable at the call of social needs.1 5
EASEMENTS OF ACCESS TO SUNLIGHT

An easement is a privilege, a benefit without profit which accrues
to the owner of one parcel of land from the land of another.1 6 A
common example: A and B are adjoining landowners. A roadway
crosses A's property connecting B's property with a highway. B may
obtain the right to utilize that roadway and to prohibit A from
obstructing it, destroying it, or preventing B from traveling upon it.
B's right to use the right-of-way would be characterized as an easement. Easements are, however, not limited to affirmative easements' 7 such as rights-of-way. Negative easements 8 may also be
created to favor landowner B. A negative easement prohibits the
servient tenant, the party whose property is subject to the easement,
from doing certain acts upon that property to the detriment of the
dominant tenant, the party whose property is benefitted by the easement. In contrast to his rights under an affirmative easement, the
dominant tenant in a negative easement has no right to go upon or
utilize the property of the servient tenant.' 9
The reported negative easement cases are generally concerned with
easements of sunlight for illumination through windows or doors of a
building, 2" easements for the free flow of air 2 ' or easements for
view. 2 2 The nature of these negative easements and the nature of the
15. Cardozo, The Paradoxes of Legal Science in Selected Writings of Benjamin N. Cardozo 332 (M. Hall ed. reprint 1975).
-,
248 N.W. 869, 873 (1933);
16. E.g., Hasselbring v. Koepke, 463 Mich. 466,
Black's Law Dictionary 599 (rev. 4th ed. 1968).
17. An affirmative easement s one in which the dominant tenant has rights to utilize the
servient tenement. Common examples include a right-of-way or a drain. Black's Law Dictionary 599 (rev. 4th ed. 1968);See generally 3 R. Powell, supra note 11, at 405.
18. Solar access easements are categorized as negative easements. A negative easement is
one in which the servient tenant is prohibited from doing some lawful act on his property
because it will affect a right held by the dominant tenant. Black's Law Dictionary 600 (rev.
4th ed. 1968). Examples of negative easements are easements for light, air and view. The
purpose of each of those easements is to prohibit the servient tenant from obstructing the
light, air or view of the dominant tenant. This article will be using cases involving negative
easements in exploring the solar access rights of an individual landowner. See generally 3 R.
Powell, supra note 11, at 405.
19. See notes 18 supra and 23 infra.
20. Petersen v. Friedman, 162 Cal. App. 2d 245, 328 P.2d 264 (1958); Homewood
Realty Corp. v. Safe Deposit and Trust Co., 160 Md. 457, 154 A. 58 (1931); Kakas Bros.
Co. v. Kaplan, 331 Mass. 323, 118 N.E.2d 877 (1954); Kesseler v. Bowditch, 223 Mass. 265,
111 N.E. 887 (1916); Bornstein v. Doherty, 204 Mass. 280, 90 N.E. 531 (1910); Brooks v.
Reynolds, 106 Mass. 31 (1870); Hagerty v. Lee, 45 N.J. Eq. 1, 15 A. 399 (Ch. 1888).
21. Hagerty v. Lee, 45 N.J. Eq. 1, 15 A. 399 (Ch. 1888).
22. E.g., Petersen v. Friedman, 162 Cal. App. 2d 245, 328 P.2d 264 (1958). In this case
the plaintiff and defendant were adjoining landowners. The plaintiffs property carried with
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easement needed to assure adequate sunlight for an individual solar
energy user [hereinafter called a solar access easement] are the same:
each prohibits the servient tenant from erecting or maintaining an
obstruction which hinders the purpose of the easement.2 3 A solar
access easement would prohibit the servient tenant from maintaining
or erecting any barrier 2 4 which would block the passage of sunlight
across his property to the solar collector located on the property of
the dominant tenant. As a result, the solar energy user would have a
right to the sunlight.

Solar access easements would intrude less upon the interests of a
servient tenant than would an affirmative easement, such as a rightof-way. For example, assume A, the dominant tenant, has a solar
access easement across B's property. A's easement cuts through airspace above B's property. B may use his property and airspace below
the easement and perhaps above it. B may build a fence, a building,

or plant trees and bushes directly beneath the path of the easement.
B is prohibited from obstructing the path of the sunlight within the
confines of A's solar access easement. Yet there is no physical use of
the easement on B's property by A. A has no right to travel upon B's
premises; A's rights are limited solely to the free access of sunlight

within the confines of the easement.' s Compare this limitation to a
right-of-way easement located across the same portion of B's prop-

erty. That easement prohibits B from erecting fences, planting trees
and bushes, or placing other obstructions across the right-of-way. B
it an expressly created easement of light, air and view over the defendant's land. The court
ordered the defendant to remove television aerials and antennae which encroached on the
plaintiff's easement. The court, in so doing, stated that easements of light, air and view may
be created by grant.
23. A structure which violates the open and unobstructed light and air within the confines of the easement will then violate the rights of a dominant tenant who has such an
easement. See Ladd v. City of Boston, 151 Mass. 585, 24 N.E. 858 (1890). If the dominant
tenant's easement is for view, then a television antenna constructed by the servient tenant
infringing upon the view will also damage the rights of the dominant tenant. E.g., Petersen v.
Friedman, 162 Cal. App. 2d 245, 328 P.2d 264 (1958). These negative easements prohibit
certain acts by the servient tenant upon his property. They do not provide that the dominant tenant may utilize or travel upon the servient tenant's property. If the servient tenant
performs the prohibited acts (i.e., obstructing light), then a cause of action is created in the
dominant tenant.
24. The barrier may include a fence, building, tree or bushes. It would not be limited to a
specific instrument of obstruction. Rather it could include anything which would have the
effect of blocking the flow of sunlight across the servient tenant's property to the solar
collector on the dominant tenant's property.
25. However, it is conceivable and probably prudent for A, in creating the express solar
access easement, to also acquire an easement of access to go upon B's premises to remove
any obstructions within the confines of the solar access easement. This type. of increased
protection of the interest of the dominant tenant is used in the creation of avigation
easements, which are easements for unobstructed airspace for the landing and taking off of
airplanes. E.g., United States v. 64.88 Acres, 244 F.2d 534 (3d Cir. 1977).
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loses the use of a portion of the surface of his property for everything but a roadway. Surely this is a more intrusive infringement
upon B's property than a solar access easement would be.
Access easements similar to solar easements are often created near
2
airports. 2 6 They are called avigation and clearance easements. 7
26. These easements are frequently expressly created by means of a condemnation proceeding whereby the government seeks to have a certain definable airspace taken for the
purpose of creating an open glidepath to an airport. E.g., United States v. Brondum, 272
F.2d 642 (5th Cir. 1959). Alternatively, landowners adjoining an airport may seek to have
such an easement declared taken by the government. In this way such landowners also
receive compensation. Once again, a certain definable swath of airspace is required to be
kept unobstructed. E.g., Western v. McGehee, 202 F. Supp. 287 (D. Md. 1962).
27. Two types of easements are created for safety in landing and taking off of aircraft.
One such easement is an avigation easement. By its terms, it expressly permits flights over
land adjoining the airport at such a low altitude or so frequently as to amount to a taking of
that property. E.g., United States v. Brondum, 272 F.2d 642 (5th Cir. 1959); Western v.
McGehee, 202 F. Supp. 287 (D. Md. 1962). The concept of frequent or low overflights over
land adjoining a public airport as a taking of that property under the fifth amendment to
the United States Constitution was established in the leading case, United States v. Causby,
328 U.S. 256 (1945), in an opinion by Justice Douglas. Causby owned a chicken farm which
was near an airfield. During World War II various military aircraft frequently passed over
Causby's property. The glide path of those airplanes was eighty-three feet from the surface
of Causby's property (sixty-seven feet above his home and eighteen feet above the highest
tree). The noise from the overflights was startling and at night the lights from the airplanes
brightly lit Causby's property. As a result, his chicken business was destroyed, his family
was frequently deprived of sleep and they became nervous and frightened. Writing for the
majority, Justice Douglas stated:
The airplane is part of the modern environment of life, and the inconveniences
which it causes are normally not compensable under the Fifth Amendment.
The airspace apart from the immediate reaches above the land, is part of the
public domain .... Flights over private land are not a taking, unless they are
so low and so frequent as to be a direct and immediate interference with the
enjoyment and use of the land.
Id. at 266.
Justice Black vigorously dissented, contending that the Constitution does not authorize
the relief which the majority provided and that Congress should remedy problems caused by
air overflights. "It is inconceivable to me that the Constitution guarantees that the airspace
of this Nation needed for air navigation is owned by the particular persons who happen to
own the land beneath to the same degree as they own the surface below." Id. at 271. It is
interesting to note the clash in Causby between Douglas, who used the judicial activist
approach, and Black, who used the strict constructionist approach. The competing judicial
philosophies are examined in Berger, Government By Judiciary (1977) where the activist
approach is roundly criticized.
If there is no governmental activity involved in the airspace overflights, that is, if the
activity is solely private, there would clearly be no taking of land in the constitutional sense.
The landowners could then resort to actions in trespass or nuisance. E.g., Pueblo of Sandia
ex. rel. Chaves v. Smith, 497 F.2d 1043 (10th Cir. 1974); Hinman v. Pacific Air Transp., 84
F.2d 755 (9th Cir. 1936); Smith v. New England Aircraft Co., 270 Mass. 511, 170 N.E. 385
(1930); Crew v. Gallagher, 358 Pa. 541, 58 A.2d 179 (1948). Presumably private airspace
overflights could be provided for by the landowner's transfer of an express avigation easement across his premises to the private airstrip.
In addition to an avigation easement, clearance or flight obstruction easements also exist.
Such an easement ensures that a space shall be unoccupied and vision unobstructed at a
certain altitude. Its purpose is to assure that the glide zone for aircraft landing or taking off
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They provide for a clear and unobstructed path across the airspace
above the servient tenement. Again, however, the solar access easement would be much less intrusive upon the servient tenant's interests. The solar access easement merely requires open, unobstructed
space, while the avigation easement must also bear air traffic.
Clearly, abundant precedent exists in the negative easement area
to accommodate solar access. The balance of this paper considers the
methods of creating solar access easements.
2
EXPRESS CREATION OF SOLAR ACCESS RIGHTS 8

Easements
An express easement is a privilege or right acquired by one property owner (the dominant tenant) in or over the land of another (the
servient tenant) by words of conveyance or grant. 2 9 For example, A,
the owner of Blackacre, grants a right of way across Blackacre (for
passage to and from Whiteacre) to B, the owner of Whiteacre. An
express easement has thereby been created.3 0 Express easements are
not limited to affirmative easements, 3 1 such as rights-of-way. Courts
will be free from natural growth or man-made obstructions. E.g., United States v. Brondum,
272 F.2d 642 (5th Cir. 1959); United States v. 64.88 Acres, 244 F.2d 534 (3d Cir. 1957);
Western v. McGehee, 202 F. Supp. 287 (D. Md. 1962). The cited cases concern governmental taking of such easements. Presumably, one landowner may expressly convey such an
easement to the private airstrip. In any event, avigation easements also frequently contain
provisions concerning obstructions in the airspace. E.g., Western v. McGehee, 202 F. Supp.
287 (D. Md. 1962).
28. A few other articles have discussed the legal access right to solar energy. E.g., S.
Kraemer, Solar Law (1978); W. Thomas, A. Miller, & R. Robbins, Legal Uncertainties About
Use of Solar Energy (1978); Eisenstadt, Long and Utton, A Proposed Solar Zoning Ordinance, 15 Urb. L. Ann. 211 (1978); Eisenstadt and Utton, Solar Rights and Their Effect on
Solar Heating and Cooling, 16 Nat. Resources J. 363 (1976); Moskowitz, Legal Access to
Light: The Solar Energy Imperative, 9 Nat. Resources Law. 177 (1976); Myers, The Common Law of Solar Access: An Insufficient Protection for Users of Solar Energy, 6 Real Est.
L.J. 320 (1978); Reitze, A Solar Zoning Guarantee: Seeking New Law in Old Concepts,
1976 Wash. U.L.Q. 375; Schiflett and Zuckerman, Solar Heating and Cooling.- State and
Municipal Legal Impediments and Incentives, 18 Nat. Resources J. 313 (1978); Comment,
The Dawning of Solar Law, 29 Baylor L. Rev. 1013 (1977); Comment, Designs on Sunshine: SolarAccess in the United States and Japan, 10 Conn. L. Rev. 123 (1977); Comment,
Assuring Legal Access to Solar Energy: An Overview with Proposed Legislation for the State
of Nebraska, 12 Creighton L. Rev. 567 (1978-1979); Note, Protecting Solar Access: Preventing a Potential Problem, 7. Golden Gate U.L. Rev. 765 (1977); Note, A Legislative Approach to Solar Access: Transferable Development Rights, 13 New England L. Rev. 835
(1978); Comment, Solar Rights: Guaranteeing a Place in the Sun, 57 Or. L. Rev. 94 (1977);
Note, The Allocation of Sunlight: Solar Rights and the Prior Appropriation Doctrine, 47 U.
Colo. L. Rev. 421 (1976).
29. Hagerty v. Lee, 45 N.J. Eq. 1, 15 A. 399 (Ch. 1888). See generally 3 R. Powell, supra
note 11, at
405-09.
30. This example was taken from Casner & Leach, Cases and Text on Property 1110 (2d
ed. 1969).
31. See note 17 supra.
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have consistently held that negative easements may also be expressly
created. 3 2 A solar access easement is a negative easement.3
Express solar access easements are not limited to a grant or reservation of a fee interest in the easement. Such easements can also be
expressly created in a lease to exist solely during the term of the
leasehold. 3 4 The restriction on the servient tenant would be the
same whether the easement was granted to the dominant tenant as a
fee or for a term of years: the servient tenant would be precluded
32. There seems to be no question concerning the authority of a grantor and grantee to
create a negative easement; in fact the issue is usually never discussed. Kakas Bros. Co. v.
Kaplan, 331 Mass. 323, 118 N.E.2d 877 (1954). See also 3 R. Powell, supra note 11, at
414 (8). In one case, however, the issue was discussed as it related to a probate commissioner's authority to grant such an easement when partitioning a parcel of real property.
Bornstein v. Doherty, 204 Mass. 280, 90 N.E. 531 (1910). The probate commissioner
partitioned real property awarding a portion to the decedent's son and a portion to the
decedent's daughter. The son received, appurtenant to his parcel, an easement of light and
air across the land partitioned to the daughter. The plaintiff in the action had taken title
through the son's chain of title and sought to enjoin obstruction by the defendant, who had
taken through the daughter's chain of title. The issue was whether the probate commissioner
had jurisdiction to create the light and air easement upon partition of the real estate. The
court asserted that there was "no doubt of the jurisdiction of the court in partition proceedings to annex reasonable easements to one part of the land and impose reasonable servitudes
upon another part for the benefit of the several owners in their use of their respective shares
of the property." Id at 283-84, 90 N.E. at 532.
See also Homewood Realty Corp. v. Safe Deposit and Trust Co., 160 Md. 457, 154 A. 58
(1931) (dicta); Kesseler v. Bowditch, 223 Mass. 265, 111 N.E. 889 (1916). The court in
Homewood Realty discussed the legal basis for creating light and air easements in Maryland
in 1931. It stated that such easements could not be created by prescription. Light and air
easements could, however, be created by express grant, reservation or express covenant. The
court also indicated that such easements could be created by implied grant if it could be
shown that the grantor retained a portion of the premises he conveyed and that as a result
of the severance the easement would be reasonably necessary for the enjoyment of the
conveyed portion. See also Petersen v. Friedman, 162 Cal. App. 2d 245, 328 P.2d 264
(1958); Kakas Bros. Co. v. Kaplan, 331 Mass 323, 118 N.E.2d 877 (1954).
33. See note 18supra.
34. Keating v. Springer, 146 Im.481, 34 N.E. 805 (1893). In this case the parties entered
into a ten-year lease wherein Springer conveyed to Keating a space in a building and the
yard behind the building to be used as a marble works. In addition, the lease restricted
Springer, the lessor, from constructing a structure a) nearer than twenty-five feet to the rear
of the premises conveyed to Keating and b) if the structure were higher than six feet, then it
had to be placed so as not to obstruct light to Keating's premises. At the time of the lease,
the property surrounding the building was virtually vacant. Two years after the term of the
lease had begun, Springer constructed a five-story building adjacent to the building in which
Keating leased space. In addition, boilers and other obstructions were placed at the rear of
that building. Keating brought an action for the cutting off of his light, but it was dismissed
by the trial court. On appeal, the court analyzed the law concerning easements for light and
air. It concluded by stating: "It follows that a landlord will not be liable for obstructing his
tenant's windows by building on the adjacent close in the absence of any covenant or
agreement in the lease forbidding him to do so." Id at 493, 34 N.E. at 807. The court then
held that, because of the covenant in the lease, Keating should have had the opportunity at
trial to show that Springer's construction obstructed the light flowing into his premises. If
this showing could be made, Keating would prevail.
The following cases do not construe lease language granting the lessee a light and air
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from obstructing the flow of sunlight." s An individual solar energy
user may clearly obtain an express easement protecting his access to
sunlight.
Covenants
Ample precedent exists 3 6 to support the creation of solar access
rights by express covenant 3 7 in a deed. The cases involving covenants
providing access to sunlight for illumination, air flow or view consistently uphold the principle that each access may be created by exeasement. However, in dicta, the courts concede that at least one way (and at times the only
way) for a lessee to assure access to light and air across his leased premises is to have access
to light and air conveyed to him as a part of his leasehold interest. Clark v. Mountain States
Life Ins. Co., 1 Cal. App. 2d 301, 36 P.2d 848 (1934); Hampe v. Elia, 251 Mass. 465, 146
N.E. 730 (1925); Tomburo v. Liberty Freehold Theatre Corp., 131 N.J. Eq. 513, 25 A.2d
909 (1942); Joseph v. Lidsky, 34 Misc. 2d 606, 226 N.Y.S.2d 636 (N.Y. Mun. Ct. 1962);
Aliber v. Remsen St. Co., 31 Misc. 2d 786, 221 N.Y.S.2d 464 (Sup. Ct. 1961); Mannino v.
Conoco Realty Corp., 86 N.Y.S.2d 855 (Sup. Ct. 1949); O'Neill v. Breese, 3 Misc. 219, 23
N.Y.S. 526 (Sup. Ct. 1893); Spies v. Damm, 54 How. Pr. 293 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1877); Myers v.
Gemmel, 10 Barb. 537 (N.Y. 1851). In Lidsky, the court declared that a lessee does not
possess an implied easement for light and air over the adjoining premises whether that
premises is owned by his lessor or not. The court declared that light and air easements must
be created by express terms.
35. Although the cases cited concern restrictions placed upon the lessor for the benefit
of the lessee, the lessor may also reserve such an easement for his benefit across the leased
premises. The essence of the express grant concept is that the parties have negotiated and
agreed upon certain rights and restrictions which will govern their behavior during the term
of the lease unless the provision is against public policy.
36. Sain v. Silvestre, 78 Cal. App. 3d 461, 144 Cal. Rptr. 478 (1978) where mutual
servitude was imposed on lots in a subdivision restricting obstruction of the view of a
canyon. In Bryan v. Gosse, 155 Cal. 132, 99 P. 499 (1909), the court held that creation of
light and air easements was not limited to express grant, but could also be created by
covenant. In Jackson v. Eli, 23 App. D.C. 122 (1904), the court upheld and construed a
covenant created in 1860 which prohibited the grantor and his successors from obstructing
windows of a house conveyed to the grantee (and his successors). Day v. McEwen,
-Me.
, 385 A.2d 790 (1978), involved an express covenant in a deed for an unobstructed
ocean view. See also Ladd v. City of Boston, 151 Mass. 585, 24 N.E. 858 (1890). Justice
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Justice of the Massachusetts Supreme Court, wrote the opinion in
Ladd The litigants' predecessors in title were parties to an indenture, whereby it was
covenanted that the land in front of and immediately across the street from the plaintiff's
property could not be built upon above a certain height. The city acquired the land in front
of and immediately across the street from the plaintiffs land and proceeded to construct a
courthouse. The plaintiff sued the city for taking his easements of light and air by constructing a courthouse higher than the prescribed limits. In overruling the lower court's grant of
the city's motion to dismiss, Justice Holmes stated that easements of light and air may be
created across neighboring land within reasonable limits, by words of covenant as well as
words of grant. In Lattimer v. Livermore, 72 N.Y. 174 (1878), the court enforced a covenant which provided the plaintiff landowner an easement of air, light and vision. See also
Sandstom v. Larsen, 59 Hawaii 491, 583 P.2d 971 (1978). The court upheld an injunction
ordering the demolition of a house which was built (with knowledge and in spite of warnings) in violation of a height restriction covenant to protect the view.
37. See note 11 supra.
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press covenant." s Oliver Wendell Holmes, writing for the court in
Ladd v. City of Boston,3" stated, "Easements of light and air may be
created across neighboring land, within reasonable limits, by deed.
40
Such may be created by words of covenant as well as of grant."
The burden placed upon the restricted party by the covenants in
the reported cases is the same as the burden which would be imposed
on the restricted party by a covenant for solar access. The restricted
party would be prohibited from blocking the flow of sunlight across
his property to his neighbor's solar collector. Upholding the solar
access covenant is only a small step from upholding covenants which
restrict obstruction of sunlight for illumination, free flow of air or a
picturesque view.4 1 A court which has enforced an unobstructed
view covenant 4 2 similarly could be expected to enforce a solar access
covenant.
Problems with Express Creation of Solar Access Easements
Courts will enforce express easements or covenants pertaining to
solar access rights. Yet at least two problems remain: the practical
38. E.&, Lattimer v. Livermore, 72 N.Y. 174 (1878). In upholding the plaintiff's right to
relief from the defendant's violation of a restrictive covenant for light, air and view, the
court stated that one of the valuable elements and inducements for the plaintiff to purchase
her home was the light and air advantages attached to it by reason of the covenant language.
See also cases cited at note 36 supra.
39. 151 Mass. 585, 24 N.E. 858 (1890).
40. Id. at 588, 24 N.E. at 859.
, 385 A.2d 790 (1978), the court construed a
-Me.
41. In Day v. McEwen,
covenant for unobstructed view and the burdens it placed upon the restricted party. The
litigants' deeds were traced to a single owner who had placed a reservation of an ocean view
on the plaintiff's parcel and a covenant not to obstruct that view on the defendant's parcel.
The plaintiff sued defendant for planting and allowing trees and bushes to grow in such a
manner as to obstruct the plaintiff's view of Merriconeag Sound in South Harpswell, Maine.
The plaintiff contended that the covenant of unrestricted view in his deed imposed a duty
on the defendant not to permit natural growth to obstruct the plaintiffs view. The court
upheld the plaintiffs position and enforced the covenant against the defendant. The court
stated that an unobstructed view of the ocean was regarded by allparties as contributing to
the property's value. In addition, the parties accepted and knew about the ocean view
covenant when they took the deed. Therefore, the court concluded, the defendant must
monitor and cut back the growth of obstructing trees and bushes which restrict the plaintiff's ocean view.
The enforcement of the covenant in Day is similar to the enforcement necessary for a
solar access easement. It is not important whether the obstruction is natural, such as a tree
or hedge, or man-made, such as a fence or building. What is central to the covenant is that
the open, unobstructed area remain open and unobstructed. The easement for the view (or
solar access) would also, as discussed in Day, contribute to the value of the property.
Clearly, an energy system powered by the sun would be a valuable addition to the premises.
Its obstruction would surely diminish the value and require the owner to seek an alternative
energy source. See also Sandstom v. Larsen, 59 Hawaii 491, 583 P.2d 971 (1978).
-, 385 A.2d 790 (1978).
-Me.
42. Day v. McEwen,
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economics of acquiring the rights and the legal draftsmanship necessary to secure those rights.
The cost of acquiring express solar access rights may be prohibitive
in some cases. A real estate developer who plans a subdivision should
be able to provide a deed covenant assuring access to sunlight. Developers frequently insert covenants providing for open and unobstructed views where the development is located in a scenic area 4 3 or
to protect each lot purchaser's enjoyment of sunlight and breezes. 4 4
Although a restrictive covenant providing for unobstructed solar
access may discourage some purchasers, other buyers, concerned
about home energy costs and confident that solar technology will
prevail, should be drawn by such an inducement.
Owners of preexisting homes not subject to solar access covenants
may secure solar access rights through an express easement. Securing
such an easement may, however, pose two additional problems for
homeowners: first, the cost of the easement and second, the extent
of the easement to be purchased. Homeowners who require solar
access easements will need to obtain them from their neighbors. As
in any buy-sell situation, some easements may be purchased inexpensively, some may cost a lot, some may be exchanged for a reciprocal
solar access easement, and some may be unavailable for sale at any
price. The cost may fluctuate according to the juxtaposition of the
parcels of land.
Another expense problem may exist where the solar access easement crosses the property of more than one adjacent landowner. s
For example, solar energy user A may require a certain amount of
sunlight to strike his solar collector during the day. Since the sun
always changes its angle in relation to the collector, A may need
access rights across other property than that of neighbor B. This may
require A to purchase access easements from several lot owners in the
area, compounding A's expense for the easement. Thus, in addition
to the cost of equipment, the prospective solar homeowner will often
have to pay for the right to solar access. This added expense may
make individual conversion to solar power uneconomical even when
the technology is available. Ensuring the right to solar access by
means of potentially costly express easements may inhibit rather
than promote a trend toward solar power.
43. E.g., Sain v. Silvestre, 78 Cal. App. 3d 461, 144 Cal. Rptr. 478 (1978); Day v.
McEwen,
-Me.
-, 385 A.2d 790 (1978).
44. Ladd v. City of Boston, 151 Mass. 585, 24 N.E. 858 (1890); Lattimer v. Livermore,
72 N.Y. 174 (1878).
45. See Moskowitz, Legal Access to Light: The Solar Energy Imperative, 9 Nat. Resources Law. 177, 201 (1977).
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An alternative to purchasing the total easement would be to purchase it subject to certain uses by the servient tenant.4 6 Although
this would not guarantee protection from a refusal to convey the
easement or from an exceptionally high price, it might encourage
some neighbors toward accommodation of the solar energy user. The
user would need to determine the time of day his collector operated
most efficiently and the amount of sunlight exposure his collector
reasonably needed for the year. 4 7 He could then forego a totally
unobstructed solar access easement for one which allowed some collector shading during certain times of the day. The lessened burden
on the servient tenant might induce him to convey such rights of
access to the solar energy user at a reasonable price or in trade.
Perhaps a lease for the solar access easement could be negotiated.
Although this would not provide permanent protection to the solar
collector, it might assuage the fears of a servient tenant who would
otherwise be asked to grant a fee interest in his airspace. Alternatively, where the dominant tenant could use less than one hundred
percent unobstructed sunlight, a lease arrangement would give the
parties reason to rearrange the location of the easement to best effect
the trade off. Although a lease is not a perfect solution, it could
allow some solar energy users to plan on an access right to sunlight
for a period of time. It might induce the servient tenant to later grant
an easement once he determined that solar access had a minimal
effect on his use of his property.
An insufficient legal description of a solar access easement could
comprise the second major problem. Careful drafting would be required if the solar access rights were created either by express covenant 4 8 or by express easement. 4 9 Language which expressly creates
46. See Eisenstadt and Utton, supra note 10, at 401-13.
47. Id During the day, as sunlight strikes the solar collector, the liquid in the system will
heat up and be the hottest just before sunset. The liquid will cool as it is used to heat the
building at night, and will be at its coolest temperature in the morning. Because of the
temperature change, the liquid in the morning will increase temperature at a faster rate than
at any other time during the day (assuming sunlight exposure). Therefore, the solar collector's efficiency is greater in the morning. Id at 402-03.
In addition, if the system is designed for the most severe heating day of the year then it is
necessarily overdesigned for the balance of the year. This should encourage a trade off
between the solar user's access needs and the neighbor's needs, since all-day exposure to
sunlight over a certain space may not be required. Id. at 404.
48. E.g., University Hils, Inc. v. Patton, 427 F.2d 1094 (6th Cir. 1970). This case
concerns restrictive covenants in general. The court found that the state of Ohio had a
policy favoring free and unrestricted use of land. As a result, covenants restricting the free
use of land, although permitted, had to be "strictly construed against limitations upon such
use, and ... all doubts should be resolved against a possible construction thereof which
would increase the restriction upon the use of such real estate." Id. at 1099. See also
Southern Advertising Co. v. Sherman, 43 Tenn. App. 323, 308 S.W.2d 491 (1957). That
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solar access easements should clearly describe the boundaries of those
easements. If not, a portion of the easement may be lost through non
use." ° In addition, the solar energy user may want to establish
the length of time and hours of the day when clear access is guaranteed. That would assure the necessary sunlight to power his solar
energy system. Otherwise, a court may become involved in determining the solar user's necessary sunlight, especially if his easement
involves the aforementioned trade offs with the servient tenant.5 A
case involved a restrictive covenant against obstructing the view of an outdoor motel sign.
The case concerned the right to enforce a covenant on land not originally the subject of the
covenant, but later acquired by the restricted party (defendant). The court held that the
restriction would not extend beyond the original tract of land. If the covenant was personal
to the lessor it would not be binding on his grantee (the defendant). If the covenant runs
with the land, at least in absence of expressed contrary intentions, its operation must be
confined to property as it existed at the time of the covenant.
The cases cited above suggest the importance of careful and complete drafting of covenants. It is clear that draftsmanship will also be important for solar access covenants.
49. E.g, Kakas Bros. Co. v. Kaplan, 331 Mass. 323, 118 N.E.2d 877 (1954); Kesseler v.
Bowditch, 223 Mass. 265, 111 N.E. 887 (1916). See also Moskowitz, Legal Access to Light.
The Solar Energy Imperative, 9 Nat. Resources Law. 177, 201 (1976).
50. See Kesseler v. Bowditch, 223 Mass. 265, 111 N.E. 887 (1916), where an express
easement for light and air was created in favor of the plaintiff's property in an 1825
conveyance. The deed contained the following language which created the express easement
of light and air: "Also the privilege of putting two or three windows in the north side of
each dwelling house which may be built on said premises, provided the same be blinded with
reverse blinds." Id. at 267, 111 N.E. at 887. A house was constructed on the premises in
1835 with three windows overlooking the defendant's land pursuant to the above grant. The
windows existed in the same location for over eighty years. The court held that the rights of
the parties concerning the right to sunlight was settled but was limited to the three windows. The court agreed with the plaintiff that mere non use of an express easement does not
extinguish it. However, the court stated that the plaintiff and his predecessors in title
permanently fixed the location of the easement which could not be changed.
51. E.g, Hagerty v. Lee, 45 N.J. Eq. 1, 15 A. 399 (1888). Although this case involves
access to light and air through windows, its principle would be equally applicable to the
flow of sunlight to a solar collector. The plaintiff conveyed half of his land to the defendant's predecessor in title. The deed contained the following reservation: "Reserving the
right to the free use of the light and air over the tract above described, in case he [the
plaintiff] should build on the common line between the parties, and the right to put windows in said building, overlooking the tract above described." Id at 2, 15 A. at 399.
Subsequently the plaintiff built on the common line. The defendant, who took title from
his predecessor subject to the reservation, built in such a way as to shut out the light from
two of the plaintiff's windows and partly obstructed two others. Clearly, the court said, the
reservation in the deed operated as an express easement for light and air across the defendant's land. However, it was not clear that the plaintiff reserved the right to an unlimited (or
unnecessary) amount of windows having access to light and air across the defendant's
property. Therefore, since the plaintiff did not show that the defendant's building substantially deprived him of light and air, and since at least one window per room remained
unobstructed, the court dissolved the injunction that had been granted to plaintiff. The
court stated that the plaintiffs right pursuant to the reservation to maintain unnecessary
windows needed to be established before an injunction would issue.
In Hagerty, the court construed the reservation of an easement for light and air through
windows to mean a reasonable amount. A similar analysis could be applicable if the express
easement involved solar access rights. One can anticipate that a court would weigh heavily
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competent draftsman would not want his client to litigate to determine the extent of his rights because an important function of legal
drafting is to limit the areas of dispute which may be resolved by a
court. For a matter as important to the user as "necessary sunlight,"
creative and skillful drafting is required. 2
In summary, it is clear that solar access easements may be created
by express easement or express covenant. Problems may, however,
exist for solar energy users who attempt to assure access to sunlight
by those means.
PRESCRIPTIVE CREATION OF SOLAR ACCESS EASEMENTS
In General
An easement may be created through use in addition to being
expressly created in a document."3 The doctrine of prescription is
historically based upon the presumption of a grant which arises
through long-term use of the easement.' ' The principle behind this
presumption was discussed in a nineteenth century case concerning
the creation of light and air easements by prescription.' I The court
stated:
[W] hen one person knowingly permits another for a long course of
years and without molestation or interruption to claim and enjoy
rights, easements, or servitudes, injurious to him or his estate, it
would be against man's experience and contrary to his motives of
conduct to account for it so satisfactorily in any other manner, as to
presume, that he had authorized it by some grant or agreement.5 6
Later cases adopted a legal formula which, if met, would change
the mere use of the easement into a legal right .5s 7 This legal formula
has four major components. First, the use of the easement must be
the argument of the solar energy user whose power system requires adequate access to
sunlight. The draftsman would not, however, want to leave that determination with a third
party. A court might defer to a defendant hospital whose new wing would shade the
plaintiff's solar collector an additional ten percent per day resulting in less power. Yet, that
same court might not be so swayed if that hospital builds the wing in the plaintiff's back
yard. The draftsman should be careful to protect the user's property rights by fully describing the extent of the solar access easement. See generally 3 R. Powell, supra note 11, at
415.
52. This article will not further explore the drafting of solar access easements and covenant problems. Such discussion is left for another day. See S. Kraemer, Solar Law (1978).
53. See note 14 supra.
54. The following cases discuss the doctrine of creating easements by prescription when
those easements are for light and air: Jesse French Piano & Organ Co. v. Forbes, 129 -Ala.
471, 29 So. 683 (1901); Pierre v. Fernald, 26 Me. 436, 439 (1847); Parker v. Foote, 19
Wend. 309, 313 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1838); Napier v. Bulwinkle, 39 S.C.L. (5 Rich.) 311 (1852).
55. Pierre v. Fernald, 26 Me. 436 (1847).
56. Id. at 439-40.
57. A case which analyzes the length of time that has historically been required to
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either with the knowledge of the person against whom the easement
is claimed, or so open, notorious, visible and uninterrupted that the
knowledge of the person against whom it is claimed will be presumed. Second, the use must be exercised under a claim of right
adverse to the interests of the property owner. Third, the use must
be acquiesced in by the owner. Acquiescence in the user's conduct
does not mean consent or permissive use of the easement. It means a
passive submission to the user's conduct by the property owner.5 8
Fourth, the use must be continuous and uninterrupted for a period
of time.5 9 Twenty years appears to be the normally required time
period, although the period is controlled by state law and may differ
from the twenty year norm. 60
An easement by prescription often involves a right-of-way. For
example, A and B own adjoining tracts of land. A extends a gravel
road on his land across the land of B. For over twenty years A
regularly uses the road and B is aware of that use. A keeps B's fence
open at the roadway and re-gravels and grades the road. B has knowledge of A's use but takes no action to consent to A's use or to
enforce his rights and make A stop. If the prescriptive period is
twenty years, then A has established an easement by prescription
across B's property. B would then be precluded from interfering with
A's use. 6 1
change mere use of the easement into a legal right is Clawson v. Primrose, 4 Del. Ch. 643
(1873). The plaintiff in that case owned a home overlooking the defendant's unimproved
property. For over thirty-five years the plaintiff enjoyed light and air through windows
which faced the defendant's property. The plaintiff sought an injunction to prevent the
defendant from building in such a manner as to totally darken his windows. The court's
lengthy historical analysis of the required prescriptive time period was made in the context
of determining whether the plaintiff had established a prescriptive right to the light and air
flowing across the defendant's property.
58. See generally Dartnell v. Bidwell, 115 Me. 227, 98 A. 743 (1916); Black's Law
Dictionary 40 (rev. 4th ed. 1968).
59. E.g., Jesse French Piano & Organ Co. v. Forbes, 129 Ala. 471,
-,
29 So. 683,
685 (1901); Parker v. Foote, 19 Wend. 309, 313 (N.Y. Sup. Ct 1838).
60. Clawson v. Primrose, 4 Del. Ch. 643, 655-64 (1873), although overruled by Lynch v.
Hill, 24 Del. Ch. 95, 6 A.2d 614 (1939), contains an historical analysis of the various time
periods required to change a use into a legal right.
61. The A and B hypothetical case satisfies the four-part test for acquiring an easement
by prescription. First, A's use of the roadway across B's property was known by R Second,
A used the roadway under a claim of right which was adverse to the interests of B. A graded
and graveled the road across B's property as well as kept B's fence open at the roadway
point. Clearly A treated the roadway as his own which was contrary to any right of B.
Third, B acquiesced in A's use of the roadway. He knew of A's use but did nothing either to
give A consent or to attempt to enforce his rights. B passively submitted to A's use of the
roadway across his property. And fourth, assuming the prescriptive time period was twenty
years, then A fulfilled that requirement. Since all requirements of the legal formula for
prescription have been met, A would have established a roadway easement across B's land
by prescription.
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There is no question that roadways, drains and other physical
invasions of another's land may result in an easement by prescription.6 2 Rights to sunlight have not been accorded similar treatment.
Although prescriptive easements for light and air existed6 3 in the
early nineteenth century and up to 1939 in one state,6 4 courts have
subsequently refused to allow the creation of such easements by
prescription in all states where the issue has been decided. 6 5
62. See generally 3 R. Powell, supra note 11, at 413.
63. DELAWARE-Bringhurst v. O'Donnell, 14 Del. Ch. 225, 124 A. 795 (1924); Clawson v. Primrose, 4 Del. Ch. 643 (1873); ILLINOIS-Gerber v. Grabel, 16 I11. 217 (1854);
MASSACHUSETTS-Fifty Assocs. v. Tudor, 72 Mass. (6 Gray) 255 (1856). This case arose
prior to the enactment of a statute in Massachusetts in 1852 which declared that no person
shall, by merely continuing the existence of windows overlooking land of another, acquire
any easement of light and air across that land. Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 87, § 1 (West
1977). NEW JERSEY-Robeson v. Pittenger, 2 N.J. Eq. 57 (Ch. 1838); SOUTH CAROLINA-McCready v. Thomson, 23 S.C.L. (Dud.) 131 (1838); WEST VIRGINIA-Cunningham v. Dorsey, 3 W. Va. 293 (1869).
64. Delaware was the last state to overturn its earlier holding that light and air easements
may be created by prescription. Lynch v. Hill, 24 Del. Ch. 86, 6 A.2d 614 (1939). This was
not due to lack of opportunity. In 1924 the Delaware court reaffirmed the doctrine that
light and air easements may be created by prescription. Bringhurst v. O'Donnell, 14 Del. Ch.
225, 124 A. 795 (1924).
65. The leading case is Parker v. Foote, 19 Wend. 309 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1838).
The facts of Parker v. Foote are briefly as follows: The defendant, who owned adjoining
lots, conveyed one to a man named Stebbins in 1808. Stebbins built a home on his lot to
the boundary line with windows overlooking the defendant's property. The same year the
defendant built an addition onto his home which left a sixteen-foot wide alleyway between
the two homes. In 1832 the defendant built a store on his property which filled the
sixteen-foot alleyway. The plaintiffs, then the owners of Stebbins' lot, brought an action
against the defendant for obstructing the lights to their home.
The court's extensive discussion of creating easements for light and air by prescription is
dicta. The lower court judge wholly withheld from jury consideration the question of the
presumption of the plaintiff's easement rights to light and air. The New York Supreme
Court found this to be reversible error since the presumption issue was one of mixed law
and fact and should have been submitted to the jury. At the time, light and air easements
could be created by prescription in New York. The court stated:
It has never been doubted that the inference arising from twenty years' enjoyment of incorporeal rights, might be explained and repelled; nor, so far as I
have observed, has it ever been denied that questions of this description belong
to the jury. The presumption we are considering has been often likened to the
inference which is indulged that a bond or mortgage has been paid, when no
interest has been demanded within twenty years. Such questions must be
submitted to the jury to draw the proper conclusion from all the circumstances of each particular case.
Id at 315 (citations omitted).
The court then considered another issue, whether light and air easements may be created
by prescription, because it may "arise on a second trial, and it seems proper, therefore, to
give it some examination." Id at 316. The court analyzed the validity of claiming that an
easement of light had been created through prescription. The court held that light flowing
through the plaintiffs' windows was not adverse to, nor was it any use at all of the defendant's property. There had been no injury to the defendant during the prescriptive period
for which a legal remedy existed. The plaintiffs had merely done what they were lawfully
entitled to do-put windows in the home. Although he stood to lose the right to build on his
property, the defendant had no legal remedy with which to halt the plaintiffs' use of their
windows. The only remedy available to the defendant was to erect a wall, not for his
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PrescriptiveCreation of Sunlight and Air Easements
The historical basis in law for prescriptive light and air easements
can be found in the English doctrine of ancient lights.6 6 The doc-

trine provides that a landowner may, after uninterrupted enjoyment
of light and air from across his neighbor's property for a given period
of time,' 7 claim a title to the future uninterrupted use of that light
and air.6 8
benefit, but merely to halt the plaintiffs from making the prescriptive easement claim. "A
wanton act of this kind, although done in [sic] one's own land, is calculated to render a
man odious." Id at 318. In addition, the plaintiffs argument, if upheld "cannot be applied
in the growing cities and villages of this country without working the most mischievous
consequences." Id. at 318.
Parker v. Foote was cited by most of the other cases which refused to permit prescriptive
creation of light and air easements in the United States even though English law was to the
contrary. Its arguments become the basis of the modern rule which is universally acceptedprescriptive easements of light and air do not exist. E.g., Katcher v. Home Say. & Loan
Ass'n, 245 Cal. App. 2d 425, 53 Cal. Rptr. 923 (1966); Cain v. American Nat'l Bank &
Trust Co., 26 Ill. App. 3d 574, 325 N.E.2d 799 (1975).
The states which have reported cases repudiating prescriptive easement of light and air
are: ALABAMA-Jesse French Piano & Organ Co. v. Forbes, 129 Ala. 471, 29 So. 683
(1901); Ward v. Neal, 37 Ala. 500 (1861); CALIFORNIA-Western Granite & Marble Co. v.
Knickerbocker, 103 Cal. 111, 37 P. 192 (1894); Katcher v. Home Say. & Loan Ass'n, 245
Cal. App. 2d 425, 53 Cal. Rptr. 923 (1966); Taliaferro v. Salyer, 162 Cal. App. 2d 685, 328
P.2d 799 (1958); CONNECTICUT-Robinson v. Clapp, 65 Conn. 365, 32 A. 939 (1895)
(dicta); DELAWARE-Lynch v. Hill, 24 Del. Ch. 86, 6 A.2d 614 (1939); GEORGIA-S. A.
Lynch Corp. v. Stone, 211 Ga. 516, 87 S.E.2d 57 (1955) (dicta); Turner v. Thompson, 58
Ga. 268 (1877); ILLINOIS-Cain v. American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 26 I1. App. 3d 574,
325 N.E.2d 799 (1975); Dexter v. Tree, 117 Ill. 532, 6 N.E. 506 (1886); Guest v. Reynolds,
68 111. 478 (1873) (dicta); INDIANA-Stein v. Hauck, 56 Ind. 65 (1877); Keiper v. Klein, 51
Ind. 316 (1875); KANSAS-Lapere v. Luckey, 23 Kan. 534 (1880); KENTUCKY-Ray v.
Sweeney, 77 Ky. (14 Bush) 1 (1878); MAINE-Pierre v. Fernald, 26 Me. 436 (1847);
MARYLAND-Cherry v. Stein, 11 Md. 1 (1858); MASSACHUSETTS-Keats v. Hugo, 115
Mass. 204 (1874) (dicta); Randall v. Sanderson, 111 Mass. 114 (1872); Richardson v. Pond,
81 Mass. (15 Gray) 387 (1860); Carrig v. Dee, 80 Mass. (14 Gray) 583 (1860); Rogers v.
Sawin, 76 Mass. (10 Gray) 376 (1858); NEW JERSEY-Sutphen v. Therkelson, 38 N.J. Eq.
318 (Ch. 1884) (dicta); Hayden v. Dutcher, 31 N.J. Eq. 217 (Ch. 1879); King v. Miller, 8
N.J. Eq. 559 (Ch. 1851); NEW YORK-Sweeney v. St. John, 35 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 634 (1883),
affd, 100 N.Y. 634 (1885); Parker v. Foote, 19 Wend. 309 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1838); OHIOMullen v. Stricker, 19 Ohio St. 135 (1869) (dicta); PENNSYLVANIA-Rennyson's Appeal,
94 Pa. 147 (1880) (dicta); Haverstick v. Sipe, 33 Pa. 368 (1859) (dicta); SOUTH CAROLINA-Bailey v. Gray, 53 S.C. 503, 31 S.E. 354 (1898); Napier v. Bulwinkle, 39 S.C.L. (5
Rich.) 311 (1852); TEXAS-Klein v. Gehrung, 25 Tex. 232 (Supp. 1860); VERMONTHubbard v. Town, 33 Vt. 295 (1860); WASHINGTON-Roe v. Walsh, 176 Wash. 148, 135
P. 1031 (1913) (dicta); WISCONSIN-Depner v. United States Nat'l Bank, 202 Wis. 405,
232 N.W. 851 (1930) (dicta).
6
66. For an analysis of the English doctrine, see Lynch v. Hill, 24 Del. Ch. 86, -,
A.2d 614, 616-18 (1939); W. Thomas, A. Miller & R. Robbins, Overcoming Legal Uncertainties About Solar Energy 23 (1978); Moskowitz, Legal Access to Light: The Solar Energy
Imperative, 9 Nat. Resources Law. 177, 185-90 (1976). See also 3 R. Powell, supra note 11,
at $414 (8).
67. See note 60 supra.
68. E.g, Clawson v. Primrose, 4 Del. Ch. 643 (1873) overruled by Lynch v. Hill, 24 Del.
Ch. 86, 6 A.2d 614 (1939); Black's Law Dictionary 111 (rev. 4th ed. 1968); see Fifty
Assocs. v. Tudor, 72 Mass. (6 Gray) 255, 259 (1856).
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The American courts which applied this doctrine advanced six
reasons to justify their position. Three of the reasons reflect the
notion that the legislature, rather than the judiciary, should abandon the doctrine. 6 9 First, the courts reasoned that by virtue of
their state constitutions, the English common law continued as the
law of their states." The state law, therefore, included the doctrine
of ancient lights. This was more a conclusory statement than a justification. Once a court determined that the English rule was adopted as
common law by its state constitution, the inevitable result was that
the easement for light or air could be created by prescription."
A second rationale was that the legislature should act if the doctrine was unwise or inapplicable. It was argued that making such a
public policy choice was not the proper function of the courts. 72 By
using this rationale, the courts adopted an English policy without
analyzing its applicability to this country's condition. Only one
court 7 3 indicated a concern about the doctrine as it deferred to the
legislature; the others simply refused to act.
The courts' deference to the common law led one court to articulate a third justification: since the doctrine concerned property rights
and had been in effect for a long period of time, the property
owners' reliance on prescriptive light and air easements should not be
disturbed.7 4 The court's opinion did contain an element of warning,
which foreshadowed its action fifteen years later when the court
withdrew its approval of the doctrine of ancient lights and held that
easements for light and air could not be created by prescription. 7"
69. See generally Berger, Government b'y Judiciary (1977). Berger presents a well researched case for judicial restraint in creating law under the Constitution.
70. Bringhurst v. O'Donnell, 14 Del. Ch. 225,-., 124 A. 795, 796 (1924); Clawson v.
Primrose, 4 Del. Ch. 643, 672 (1873); Gerber v. Grabel, 16 I11.217, 219 (1854);Cunningham v. Dorsey, 3 W. Va. 293, 304 (1869).
71. See Gerber v. Grabel, 16 IU. 217 (1854). One of the reasons advanced by this court
for finding that an easement for light and air could be created by prescription was that the
English common law was in force in Illinois. Yet, rather than making a common law analysis
of the issue, the court simply embraced the English rule, nevertheless lamenting:
But in relation to this servitude upon land, by a judicial prescription of twenty
or other number of years, in analogy to the statute of limitations, I am unable
to say so much. Or that it has any adaptation at all to a country in the infancy
of its improvements, containing hundreds of embryo cities and villages and
thousands of vacant lots, waiting the demands of future population, for dwellings and other buildings for habitation and business.
Id at 223.
72. See Clawson v. Primrose, 4 Del. Ch. 643, 671 (1873); McCready v. Thomson, 23
S.C.L. (Dud.) 131 (1838). The court in McCready discussed the function of judges by
saying, "The law, as we find it, and not as we would have it, is to be our guide." Id at 134.
73. See note 71 supra.
-,
124 A. 795, 796 (1924). The court
74. Bringhu'st v. O'Donnell, 14 Del. Ch. 225,
upheld the Delaware line of cases applying the English doctrine of ancient lights which
indicated a great reluctance to disturb prior property rights decisions.
75.. Lynch v. Hill, 24 Del. Ch. 86,6 A.2d 614 (1939).
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None of the aforementioned reasons contained a real justification
for applying the doctrine of prescription to easements for light and
air. Instead, the courts expressed a philosophical position concerning
the limits of judicial power: policy choices regarding the application
of certain creational methods to light and air easements were viewed
as a legislative rather than a judicial function.
Courts applying the prescriptive easement doctrine advanced three
other justifications for their position. The first was a response to
Parker v. Foote,7 6 the leading case which opposed the application of
prescriptive easements to light and air. In Parker, the court stated
that prescriptive creation of easements for light and air was not
applicable to conditions existing in the United States.7" One court
responded by stating that there was no difference between conditions in England and those in the United States when the issue is the
necessity and enjoyment of light and air." 8 Other courts did not
agree. In fact, even the court which tendered the above rebuttal
argument seemed to have second thoughts as it concluded its opinion.9'71
As the basis of the two final justifications, some courts contended
that the nature of the doctrine made it applicable to light and air.
One of the justifications was based upon the legal fiction that a lost
grant can be inferred from long-term, uninterrupted use of light and
air across a neighbor's property." 0 The lost grant was applied to
protect the reliance interest of the user of the light and air. 8 This
argument failed to convince other courts; it was not extensively relied upon, although the fictional "lost grant" was the theoretical
basis for all prescriptive easements.
The sixth and final justification, which was used by a Delaware
court, distinguished between the legal requirements for creation of
prescriptive easements and the statute of limitations in adverse possession. 8 2 The court stated that acquiring title by prescription rested
on different principles than a title arising under the statute of limitations. The statute of limitations rested upon a notion of laches: the
76. 19 Wend. 309 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1838).
77. Id. at 318.
78. Gerber v. Grabel, 16 IUI.217, 219 (1854). It is interesting to note that near the end
of its opinion the court seems to change its mind. In one portion of the opinion the court
states that it sees no reason for the inapplicability of the English rule since light and air
should be as agreeable, wholesome and protected in the United States as in England. Later
in the opinion, the court states that it is not sure the English rule is adaptable to the fast
growing conditions of the United States. See note 71 supra.
79. Id
80. Wilson v. Cohen, 14 S.C. Eq. (Rice Eq.) 80 (1838); McCready v. Thomson, 23 S.C.L.
(Dud.) 131 (1837).
81. McCready v. Thomson, 23 S.C.L. (Dud.) 131 (1838).
82. Clawson v. Primrose, 4 Del. Ch. 643, 670-71 (1873).
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servient tenant should be barred for neglecting to pursue legal action
to recover land adversely held. Since the statute operated to bar the
long-neglected remedy of the true owner rather than as a device to
confer positive title, it applied only where there had been a disseisin
or other actionable invasion of the true owner's property.
In contrast, the law of prescription was based on a presumed grant
of title arising from long uninterrupted use rather than a policy of
quieting long-term possession arising from an actionable invasion of a
neighbor's property. This presumption rested on the neighbor's
acquiescence in the servitude, which could be evidenced not only by
failure to bring a legal action, but also by waiving the right to halt
the use by obstruction. The court also noted that the doctrine of
prescription long preceded statutes of limitation, even though the
effect of both is the same. 8 ' This justification also failed to convince
other courts.
The aforesaid reasoning failed to halt the activity which followed
Parker v. Foote8" -activity which removed light and air easements
from those created by prescription. During the next one hundred
years, the doctrine of prescriptive easements for light and air was
repudiated throughout the United States.8 s None of the arguments
by the long-overruled courts spoke to the core of the issue: should
the long-term user be protected in his enjoyment of light and air, or
should a neighbor be protected from having such encumbrances
placed upon his property? Courts which deferred to the legislature or
applied the doctrine of prescription without analyzing its appropriateness to easements for light and air could not withstand the
policy analysis advanced by other courts in the Parker v. Foote8 6
line of cases.
Four reasons were advanced by courts in their effort to expunge
prescriptive creation from easements for light and air. Two reasons
were based on public policy considerations. One policy reason was
83. Id at 672. Clawson has been overruled by Lynch v. Hill, 24 Del. Ch. 86, 6 A.2d 614
(1939), but the court's discussion of this point is still valid. The court also stated in
Ciawson:
But it by no means follows that this narrower application of the statutes of
limitation to cases in which there was a remedy by action to be barred, should
be held to limit the long previously established broader doctrine of prescription which included all cases whatsoever in which the possession or user of an
easement or servitude had been acquiesced in, as well by the waiver of a
peaceable right to obstruct as of a remedy by action.
Id
84. 19 Wend. 309 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1838).
85. See note 65 supra for a list of states which heard and rejected claims that prescriptive
easements for light and air exist.
86. Id.
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that prescriptive creation of light and air easements was not applicable to conditions in the United States.8'7
Various observations were made in support of this justification.
For example, communities are rapidly growing and ever changing8 8
with land being bought and sold almost as frequently as merchandise. 8 9 In addition, the doctrine's application could have mischievous consequences. 9" It might deprive one from building on one's
own land through the lawful, harmless act of his neighbor performed
solely upon that neighbor's land. The first houses erected in a community would acquire rights which might render useless the most
valuable business and residential lots in the community, thereby impeding change and improvement. 9' It was also argued that the doctrine would require property owners to erect barriers for the sole
purpose of obstructing light to a neighbor's windows. 9 2 This would
necessarily lead to "continual strife and bitterness of feeling between
neighbors." 9 ' One court, 94 in picturesque language, stated that such
a rule "would palsy enterprise, cripple industry, and check advancement; and the effect would be to dampen the spirits and shackle the
energies of a free people."'9 It was argued that, in a growing country, encumbrances placed upon land which restrict its use must be
carefully considered. The choice made by these courts was in favor
of free use of property, and against protecting a long-term reliance
interest.
87. See Katcher v. Home Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 245 Cal. App. 2d 425, 53 Cal. Rptr. 923
(1966); Lynch v. Hill, 24 Del. Ch. 86, 6 A.2d 614 (Ch. 1939); Parker v. Foote, 19 Wend.
309 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1838). It is interesting to note that the courts in these three cases used
the same language in stating that prescriptive easements for light and air are not suited to
conditions existing in this country. One wonders whether the court in Katcher merely
accepted the old case law justification for repudiating that doctrine or whether they inquired about the effect present conditions would have on the doctrine. Few would dispute
that the conditions in the United States have changed between 1838 and 1966.
88. Keiper v. Klein, 51 Ind. 316 (1875); Cherry v. Stein, 11 Md. 1 (1858).
89. Keiper v. Klein, 51 Ind. 316 (1875).
90. Katcher v. Home Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 245 Cal. App. 2d 425, 53 Cal. Rptr. 923
(1966); Lynch v. Hill, 24 Del. Ch. 86, 6 A.2d 614 (1939); Rogers v. Sawin, 76 Mass. (10
Gray) 376 (1858); Hayden v. Dutcher, 31 N.J. Eq. 217 (Ch. 1879); Parker v. Foote, 19
Wend. 309 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1838). Although no court lists which consequences it considers to
be mischievous, some of the problems concerning prescriptive sunlight easements may be so
categorized. They include impeding development of property, encouraging land owners to
erect otherwise useless barriers merely to block sunlight from a neighbor and causing poor
neighborly relations.
91. Pierre v. Fernald, 26 Me. 436 (1847); Cherry v. Stein, 11 Md. 1 (1858); Klein v.
Gehrung, 25 Tex. 232 (Supp. 1860); Hubbard v. Town, 33 Vt. 295 (1860).
92. Cherry v. Stein, 11 Md. 1 (1858); Klein v. Gehrung, 25 Tex. 232 (Supp. 1860);
Hubbard v. Town, 33 Vt. 295 (1860).
93. Hubbard v. Town, 33 Vt. 295, 302 (1860).
94. Keiper v. Klein, 51 Ind. 316 (1875).
95. Id. at 323.
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A second policy distinguished between affirmative prescriptive
easements and prescriptive easements for light and air. In fact, some
96
courts argued that light and air were not the subject of property.
One court 9 7 stated:
In the first place, an easement in light or air is unlike any other
easement known to the law. It is neither an appurtenance nor a
hereditament. No definition of property known to the law includes
it specifically. No exclusive right can be had in light or air; legislation
can not create such a right, because man has no exclusive domain
over them. They are for all in common .... 9s

Courts argued, in essence, that since light and air are all around and
are purely natural phenomena, they are not proper subjects for prescriptive easements. Unlike a roadway or a drain across property, use
of light and air by a dominant tenant is not discoverable through
observation by a servient tenant. 9 9
The courts advanced two other reasons for abandoning prescriptive easements, both grounded in an analysis of the legal requirements needed to create such easements. One rationale was that the
claimant made no adverse use of the servient tenant's property, while
the second suggested the servient tenant had no cause of action to
stop the use of light or air.1 00 Lack of either element, the courts
concluded, made creation of a prescriptive easement impossible.
96. Stein v. Hauck, 56 Ind. 65 (1877); Keiper v. Klein, 51 Ind. 316 (1875); Parker v.
Foote, 19 Wend. 309 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1838).
97. Stein v. Hauck, 56 Ind. 65 (1877).
98. Id. at 69.
99. Keiper v. Klein, 51 Ind. 316, 323 (1875).
100. Cases which presented the first rationale are: Jesse French Piano & Organ Co. v.
Forbes, 129 Ala. 471, 29 So. 683 (1901); Turner v. Thompson, 58 Ga. 268 (1877); Stein v.
Hauck, 56 Ind. 65 (1877); Ray v. Sweeney, 77 Ky. (14 Bush) 1 (1878); Pierre v. Fernald, 26
Me. 436 (1847); Carrig v. Dee, 80 Mass. (14 Gray) 583 (1860); Rogers v. Sawin, 76 Mass.
(10 Gray) 376 (1858); Sweeney v. St. John, 35 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 634 (1883),aff'd, 100 N.Y.
634 (1885); Parker v. Foote, 19 Wend. 309 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1838); Bailey v. Gray, 53 S.C.
503, 31 S.E. 354 (1898); Napier v. Bulwinkle, 39 S.C.L. (5 Rich.) 311 (1852); Klein v.
Gehrung, 25 Tex. 232 (Supp. 1860); Hubbard v. Town, 33 Vt. 295 (1860).
A case which presented the second rationale is King v. Miller, 8 N.J. Eq. 559 (Ch. 1851).
It is interesting to note in King that although the claim for an easement for light and air was
labeled as absurd, no precedent was cited for not applying the doctrine of ancient lights, nor
was any even mentioned. The doctrine of ancient lights was good law in New Jersey at the
time the case was decided. See Robeson v. Pittenger, 2 N.J. Eq. 57 (Ch. 1838). The doctrine
was not clearly laid to rest in New Jersey until Hayden v. Dutcher, 31 N.J. Eq. 217 (Ch.
1879). For additional discussion of the use of the lack of a cause of action as the rationale
for denying prescriptive creation of light and air easements, see Jesse French Piano and
Organ Co. v. Forbes, 129 Ala. 471, 29 So. 683 (1901); Stein v. Hauck, 56 Ind. 65 (1877);
Keiper v. Klein, 51 Ind. 316 (1875); Cherry v. Stein, 11 Md. 1 (1858); Parker v. Foote, 19
Wend. 309 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1838); Napier v. Bulwinkle, 39 S.C.L. (5 Rich.) 311 (1852); Klein
v. Gehrung, 25 Tex. 232 (Supp. 1860); Hubbard v. Town, 33 Vt 295 (1860).
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The first rationale was advanced by a number of courts." o' Because they could discover no use of the servient estate by the dominant tenant, a requisite element of prescriptive easement could not
be met. Sunlight and air could not be utilized in a way considered to
be adverse to the property rights of a neighbor. If there were no
violation of another's rights, then no presumption of a grant could
arise." 02 The courts stated that, by building a home with windows
overlooking a neighbor's land, one does no more than exercise a legal
right.1 03 There is no injury to one neighbor from another's enjoyment of light and air through those windows. Without usurping the
servient owner's rights, the dominant tenant can acquire none.1 04
He did not draw or cause the light to pass upon his premises in any
other than its natural manner; it remains upon and over the defendant's premises as it had always been. As there was no interference
with the rights of the defendant, it is difficult to see upon what the
presumption of a grant can be based. Lapse of time and the presumption arising therefrom are resorted to only to justify in one,
that which would otherwise be a violation of the rights of another.' 0

This rationale was used frequently by the courts in rejecting the
doctrine of ancient lights.' 0 6 Many courts also argued that, because
there was no violation of the servient tenant's legal rights during the
prescriptive period, he had no cause of action to prevent the expiration of the time period and the creation of an easement.' 07 There
were no legal means by which he could require the neighbor to close
his windows.' 08 The servient tenant had submitted to nothing ex101. See note 100 supra.
102. Jesse French Piano & Organ Co. v. Forbes, 129 Ala. 471, 29 So. 683 (1901). The
court stated, "One circumstance always considered is whether the user is against the interest
of the party suffering it, or injurious to him. There must be an invasion of the party's right,
, 29 So. at 685. See
for, unless one loses something, the other gains nothing." Id. at
7/so Hubbard v. Town, 33 Vt. 295 (1860).
103. E.g., Pierre v. Fernald, 26 Me. 436, 440 (1847); Parker v. Foote, 19 Wend. 309, 318
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1838); Bailey v. Gray, 53 S.C. 503, 31 S.E. 354 (1898); Klein v. Gehrung, 25
Tex. 232, 240 (Supp. 1860).
104. Hubbard v. Town, 33 Vt. 295, 299 (1860).
105. Id at 299.
106. See note 100 supra.
107. Id.
108. See Cherry v. Stein, 11 Md. 1, 22 (1858); King v. Miller, 8 N.J. Eq. 559 (Ch. 1851).
InKing, the plaintiff sought to enjoin the defendant from building on an adjacent lot in
;uch a manner as to obstruct light and air to windows in the plaintiff's home. The plaintiff
iad built his home up to his lot line and contended that the lights which would be obtructed were ancient lights under the English doctrine. At this time New Jersey had not yet
-epudiated that doctrine. Robeson v. Pittenger, 2 N.J. Eq. 57 (Ch. 1838). King did not
iscuss the doctrine as such, but merely focused on the lack of legal recourse available to the
lefendant to prevent the plaintiff's lights from becoming ancient. The court held that "a

NEW MEXICO LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 10

cept the exercise of a legal right by his neighbor. 1 0 9
The only remedy available to the servient tenant to prevent the
running of the prescriptive period was to erect a barrier obstructing
Such a legal rule, it was argued,
his neighbor's light and air.1'
would lead to bitterness and strife between neighbors because an
unneighborly act was required in order to protect one's property
rights, even when the use of that property was not harmed.' ' ' One
court' 1 2 summed up the probable impact of that ruling on the
servient tenant: "A wanton act of this kind, although done on one's
own land, is calculated to render a man odious."' ' 3 The courts also
contended that it was immaterial to a landowner what use was made
of light and air that passed through the space above his land. He
might want to keep his land unoccupied; yet the rule requires him to
build upon it solely because a neighbor's window -faced his property. 1 14

Prescriptive easements for light and air are thus not favored in the
law. The courts show a great deal of reluctance to extend the doctrine beyond roads, ditches and other easily observable uses of property to light and air.' ' With light and air there is no encroachment
on the servient tenant's property or use of which a property owner
would be aware and could stop if he so desired. There is no way to
stop the use of light and air on the property of the dominant tenant
without being required to alter the servient property by erecting an
obstruction.' 16 Courts have refused to burden estates and to risk
creating easements which would frustrate the development and use
of land.'

1

'

One court''

l

summarized the concern of many by

stating:
person by doing and continuing an act on his property which he has a right to do, and which
another has no means of preventing, can acquire no right injurious to the property of that
other." Id. at 559. To say otherwise, the court commented, "is simply absurd." Id.; Klein v.
Gehrung, 25 Tex. 232 (Supp. 1860).
109. E.g., Cherry v. Stein, 11 Md. 1, 22 (1858), where the court stated: "It is not the
common course of men to submit to their having property appropriated to the constant or
frequent use of others, having no authority to do so, and yet take no steps to stop it." See
also King v. Miller, 8 N.J. Eq. 559 (Ch. 1851); Parker v. Foote, 19 Wend. 309, 318 (N.Y.

Sup. Ct. 1838).
110. Stein v. Hauck, 56 Ind. 65, 69 (1877); Cherry v. Stein, 11 Md. 1, 22 (1858); Parker
v. Foote, 19 Wend. 309, 316 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1838); Hubbard v. Town, 33 Vt. 295 (1860).
111. E.g., Napier v. Bulwinkle, 39 S.C.L. (5 Rich.) 311 (1852); Hubbard v. Town, 33 Vt.
295 (1860).
112. Parker v. Foote, 19 Wend. 309 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1838).
113. Id. at 318.
114. E.g., Stein v. Hauck, 56 Ind. 65 (1877); Napier v. Bulwinkle, 39 S.C.L. (5 Rich.)
311 (1852).
115. E.g., Stein v. Hauck, 56 Ind. 65 (1877); Keiper v. Klein, 51 Ind. 316 (1875).
116. See notes 110 & 111 supra.
117. See cases cited in notes 111-16 supra and 118-19 infra.
118. Keiper v. Klein, 51 Ind. 316 (1875).

Winter 1979-801

EASEMENTS OF ACCESS TO SUNLIGHT

A purchaser of a house, store-room or building of any kind, can
discover by observation a way, passage, drain, conduit, pit, sink or
any other of that class of easements, and thus be put upon his guard;
but as to air, which is everywhere, and light that shines upon all,
which are independent of all fixed objects or other corporeal substances, there is no palpable guide to direct the observer where they
exist; besides, air and light may be obtained everywhere, and in
various ways, within the compass of the land itself; they are, therefore, not necessarily dependent upon the rights of others for their
enjoyment 1 9

PrescriptiveCreationApplied to Solar Access Easements
Case law seems to preclude creating solar access easements by
prescription. Because the dominant tenant would not violate any
rights of the servient tenant during the prescriptive period, the servient tenant would have no legal action to halt use of a solar collec-

tor. His only recourse would be to erect a barrier to obstruct the
passage of sunlight. Under the doctrine, the servient tenant who fails
to act could suddenly find the use of his property limited. There
seems to be little difference whether the prescriptively-claimed sun-

light easement is utilized by the dominant tenant for illumination or
for solar power; the courts focus on the fact that the easement's
effect on the servient tenant would remain unchanged. 1 20
Some cases contained language which suggested a different balance
could be struck between the interests of the servient and dominant
21 This balance hinged on a substantial deprivation of suntenants.
1
light: 22

The privation of light and air by a proposed erection will be in such
a degree as to render the occupation of the complainant's house
119. Id at 323.
120. One commentator analyzed the distinction between the English and American approaches to acquiring prescriptive easements to sunlight. He outlined three major points of
distinction. First, the English cases stressed the enjoyment, advantage and benefit of the
sunlight to the dominant parcel while the American cases focused on the invasion of a legal
right of the servient tenant or an interference with his possession. Second, the American
cases based prescriptive rights upon a tangible entry upon or a taking of property from the
servient tenant. The English cases did not consider such an entry or taking of property to be
a requisite to the creation of a prescriptive easement. Third, the "acid test" in American
prescription cases, which sunlight easements fail to meet, was the servient tenant's ability to
maintain a cause of action to prevent use of the easement by the dominant tenant. Only in
this way the servient tenant could preclude the dominant tenant from acquiring a prescriptive easement. The English courts emphasized the physical ability of the servient tenant to
obstruct the dominant tenant's use of the easement. Moskowitz, LegalAccess to Light: The
Solar Energy Imperative, 9 Nat. Resources Law. 177, 185-95 (1976).
121. E.g., Bringhurst v. O'Donnell, 14 Del. Ch. 225, 124 A. 795, 796 (1924); Fifty
Assocs. v. Tudor, 72 Mass. (6 Gray) 255 (1856); Robeson v. Pittenger, 2 N.J. Eq. 57, 62
(Ch. 1838); Wilson v. Cohen, 14 S.C. Eq. (Rice Eq.) 80 (1839).
122. E.g., Bringhurst v. O'Donnell, 14 Del. Ch. 225, 124 A. 795 (1924).
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uncomfortable, if it be a dwelling house, or if it be a place of
business, the privations must render the exercise1 of the business
materially less beneficial than it had formerly been. 23

This balancing of interests limited the amount of light the prescriptive easement holder could claim to that which was reasonably
necessary for comfort in the home or of benefit to the business. The
"balance of interests" concept appeared in a number of ancient light
cases 1 24 and should be considered in any discussion of solar access
prescriptive easements. The servient tenant's burden need not be
heavy if an obstruction of sunlight does not impair the efficiency of
the solar collector.' 25 A viable test might specify the amount of
sunlight necessary to produce a reasonable amount of solar
1
power. 26
The need for encouraging use of solar power by individuals is an
important new factor to be considered in this balancing process. A
balance could be struck to accomodate the reliance interest of the
solar energy user with the desire of the servient tenant to utilize and
develop his property.' 2 7 Such a balancing process would, however,
require a reevaluation of prescriptive easement analysis. The current
approach requires an invasion of the servient tenant's rights, which
123. Id. at
- ,124 A. at 796 (1924) (quoting Clawson v. Primrose, 4 Del. Ch. 643,
649 (1873)). Clawson was overruled by Lynch v. Hill, 24 Del. Ch. 95, 6 A.2d 614 (1939).
124. See cases cited note 121 supra.
125. See text accompanying and within notes 46-47 supra and 127 infra.
Bringhurst v. O'Donnell, 14 Del. Ch. 225, 124 A. 795 (1924).
126. See, e.g.,
127. One article suggests that such a balance could indeed be struck. Eisenstadt and
Utton, supra note 10, at 401-04. The authors suggest that the needs of the solar energy user
could be balanced against the inconvenience to his neighbor. Although much of their discussion related to solar zoning issues, the suggested balance may also be applicable to a prescriptive easement situation. The authors outlined certain factors of importance in striking
the balance. First, the site selection of the solar collector must be reasonable, that is on the
roof of the building rather than on the ground. This would necessarily place a lesser burden
on the servient tenant's use of his property. Second, the site of the collector should also be
selected so as to receive the quantity of sunlight consistent with the energy needed. If only a
few hours of sunlight contact is needed per day for the intended use of the solar energy
system then the collector should be placed (or perhaps moved) to a site which 'would
minimize the effect upon the servient tenant's use of his property. Third, the authors stated
that the existence of buildings and trees in the path of the sunlight upon the servient
tenant's property should also be a factor. It is doubtful that this factor would be of much
importance for a prescriptive easement trade off analysis. Obstructions by trees or buildings
would prevent the easement from being created in the first place.
Generally, the issue is one of a trade off. "If B is permitted to block part of A's collector,
the logical measure of how much B is blocking from A's point of view is the amount of
energy that A is losing due to B's blocking." Id. at 401.
The authors also suggest that if the solar energy system were designed for the most severe
heating or cooling day, it would necessarily be over designed for the balance of the year.
There is no need to protect all of the over design when making the trade off with a
neighbor. Id. at 404.
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can be remedied through legal action. An alternative approach, called
the English approach by one commentator, 1 28 emphasizes the benefits accruing to the dominant tenant and the servient tenant's ability
to halt the prescriptive creation through physical obstruction. 29
Some cases suggest that the doctrine may be more applicable to
rural than to urban areas.' 30 In urban areas the policy problems
which led courts' 31 to abandon the doctrine of ancient lights remain. Land in urban areas is being developed and its use is being
altered frequently. In these areas the prescriptive easement doctrine
continues to be unsuitable. Those who desire solar power in cities
should purchase their easement rights. 1 3 2 In rural or suburban communities where the existence of large buildings is unlikely, the balance should perhaps favor the solar energy user. Because a new home
or building can easily be constructed beneath the sunlight path, the
use of the servient tract would not be greatly disrupted and the
interest of the dominant solar energy tract would be protected. One
court' 33 summarized:
It would seem unreasonable that in those places where land is cheap,
and the country thinly settled, a party, after being permitted to
build his house and place his windows on the side adjoining the open
field of another man, and especially after so long a possession as to
presume a grant for that purpose, should have them obstructed by
the erection of a wall or other building, when perhaps a little accomodation, by placing the new building a few feet further off, might
work no injury to anybody; and yet in populous cities, where land is
very valuable, and it is a constant practice to place buildings side by
side, the enforcement
of the same rule might work great inconven13 4
ience and injustice.
The nature of the use of the servient estate-for solar energy as
opposed to illumination-may result in some flexibility. At least one
128. Moskowitz, Legal Access to Light: The Solar Energy Imperative, 9 Nat. Resources
Law. 177, 185-88 (1976). See note 120 supra.
129. Moskowitz, supra note 128, at 186.
130. Fifty Assocs. v. Tudor, 72 Mass. (6 Gray) 255 (1856); Robeson v. Pittenger, 2 N.J.
Eq. 57 (Ch. 1838).
131. These policy reasons include the arguments that prescriptive creation of easements
for sunlight is unsuited for conditions in the United States, existence of this method of
creation may lead to great mischief and neighborhood strife, and sunlight and air easements
are different than other easements which have been subject to prescriptive creation. See,
e.g., Parker v. Foote, 19 Wend. 309 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1838) and text accompanying notes
87-99 supra.
132. See text accompanying notes 28-52 supra for a discussion of express creation of
solar access easements and the practical problems associated therewith.
133. Robeson v. Pittenger, 2 N.J. Eq. 57 (Ch. 1838).
134. Id. at 62.
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court suggested a flexible approach concerning prescriptive avigation
easement creation.' ' ' An avigation easement is an easement across
the airspace above land through which airplanes have the right to
travel.' 36 The servient tenant, as in the prescriptive easement for
sunlight cases, is precluded
from placing obstructions within the con13 7
fines of the easement.
Prescriptive creation of avigation easements is generally not allowed by the courts. The court in Drennen v. County of Ventura,' 38
however, suggested that avigation easements may be created by prescription, even though the same court had rejected the doctrine of
ancient lights. 1 3 9 Thus, new uses of airspace above a servient tenant's property may result in creation of a prescriptive easement.
Court attack on the doctrine of ancient lights has not foreclosed
prescriptive creation of airspace easements. This suggests that the
doctrine of prescription may be re-analyzed in light of new uses of
airspace other than traditional uses of view, air circulation or sunlight
for illumination. Perhaps a perceived flexibility in prescriptive analysis in one area could be extended to include solar energy technology
as the need for fossil fuel alternatives increases.
Yet, even if prescriptive creation of solar access easements becomes universally accepted, a major practical problem remains. The
prescriptive period is too long. The homeowner or businessman who
installs a solar energy system wants immediate protection, because
his fuel supply is otherwise at the mercy of his neighbor. One may
liken his predicament to a user of coal who cannot enforce a contract
with any coal supplier for a period of twenty years. Coal would
consequently be delivered at the sole discretion of the coal companies. This situation would hardly encourage conversion to coal;
similarly, one cannot expect a lengthy prescriptive period to encourage conversion to solar energy.
135. Drennen v. County of Ventura, 38 Cal. App. 3d 84, 112 Cal. Rptr. 907 (1974);See
also Shipp v. Louisville & Jefferson County Air Bd., 431 S.W.2d 867 (Ky. 1968), cert.
denied, 393 U.S. 1088 (1968). In Shipp the court refused to consider whether a prescriptive
flight obstruction easement had been created because the airspace had not been used for the
prescriptive period. Contra, Hinman v. Pacific Air Trans., 84 F.2d 755 (9th Cir. 1936).
136. See text accompanying and within notes 26-27 supra for a discussion of avigation
easements.
137. See, e.g., Western v. McGehee, 202 F. Supp. 287 (D. Md. 1962). An avigation
easement may or may not contain provisions dealing with obstructions within the confines
of the easement. It does expressly include the right of airflight over the property. An
avigation easement is distinguishable from a clearance or flight obstruction easement which
provides that certain airspace will remain clear of obstructions, even though it may not be
the airspace through which airplanes fly. Id. at 289.
138. 38 Cal. App. 3d 84, 112 Cal. Rptr. 907 (1974).
139. Id. at 86, 112 Cal. Rptr. at 909.
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Significant problems do exist when the doctrine of prescription is
applied to solar access easements. The doctrine, if applicable at all,
will not encourage the use of solar power. As suggested, however, the
doctrine may retain some vitality to protect a solar energy user's
long-term interest in access to sunlight.
CREATION OF SOLAR ACCESS EASEMENTS BY IMPLICATION

In General
An implied easement is created by a court. It rests upon the supposed intention of the parties to a transaction as deduced from the
surrounding facts and conditions of the land to which the easement
relates.1 0 In effect, the parties fail to include mention of the easement in their conveyance; the drafters of the document of sale are
not thorough in their work.' 4 The courts are requested to include
use of the easement by the dominant tenant as part of the conveyance.'42 The doctrine of implication is often applied where one
person owns the land to which the easement relates and conveys a
portion of it to another person. If the easement is visible, known to
the parties and necessary for the reasonable use of the dominant
estate at the time of the conveyance, then courts will most likely
find that it was created by implication.
One example of an implied easement might involve a roadway. A
owns a tract of land which contains a private road leading to a
highway. A conveys a portion of his tract to B. B's tract is landlocked; it has no access to a highway except the private road. The
private road and its use was known and visible to the parties at the
time of the conveyance. In addition, it provides the only reasonable
access to B's property. In this situation a court would probably
correct the omission in the parties' documents, having inferred from
the facts
that an easement crossing A's tract was created in favor of
3
B.

1 4

140. See cases in note 13 supra.
141. See generally A. Casner & W. Leach, Cases and Text on Property 1120 (2d ed.
1969); 3 R. Powell, The Law of Real Property
410-11 (rev. ed. P. Rohan 1979).
142. E.g., Morrison v. Marquardt, 24 Iowa 35 (1868); Janes v. Jenkins, 34 Md. 1 (1871);
Nomar v. Ballard, 134 W. Va. 492, 60 S.E.2d 710 (1950); Powell v. Sims, 5 W. Va. 1 (1871);
See generally Black's Law Dictionary 599-600 (rev. 4th ed. 1968).
143. This example may be categorized as an implied grant of an easement. It is implied
from the facts and circumstances surrounding the conveyance thatA also granted B the use
of the roadway. This implied grant of an easement may be distinguished from an implied
reservation of an easement which is shown by the following example: X owns a tract of
land. A private roadway crosses the land which connects with a state highway. X conveys a
portion of his tract to Y. X's retained portion is landlocked and he has no access to the
highway except across the tract conveyed to Y upon the roadway. It may be argued that X
impliedly reserved such an easement in his conveyance of the tract to Y.
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Creation of Light and Air Easements by Implication in Grants
A number of cases have analyzed the doctrine of implied easements as applied to sunlight rights.1 44 The cases are divided concerning its applicability. Some cases refuse to extend the doctrine to
sunlight, echoing the policy reasons contained in the prescriptive
sunlight easement cases.' 4 5 Other cases apply the doctrine and
examine the facts in each case. The latter cases tend to extend easement by implication according to an undefined sliding scale of neces1
sity, the boundaries of which are necessity for enjoyment

'6

and

14 7

However, even strict necessity for sunlight may
strict necessity.
of the easement's creation. 1 4 8 The cases
evidence
not be conclusive
analyzing implied creation of sunlight easements are mainly concerned with an implied grant rather than an implied reservation. 149
Courts which discuss the distinction are unimpressed with claims of a
grantor, whose documents of conveyance are silent, to an implied
reservation of a sunlight easement.' 1 0
Courts which oppose the creation of implied easements for sunlight' I have generally justified their opposition on three grounds,
144. E.g., Robinson v. Clapp, 65 Conn. 365, 32 A. 939 (1895); S. A. Lynch Corp. v.
Stone, 211 Ga. 516, 87 S.E.2d 57 (1955); Morrison v. Marquardt, 24 Iowa 35 (1868); Keats
v. Hugo, 115 Mass. 204 (1874); Maioriello v. Arlotta, 364 Pa. 557, 73 A.2d 374 (1950).
145. See text accompanying notes 87-99 supra.
146. E.g., Janes v. Jenkins, 34 Md. 1 (1870); Engel v. Siderides, 112 N.J. Eq. 431, 164 A.
397 (1933); Greer v. Van Meter, 54 N.J. Eq. 270, 33 A. 794 (Ch. 1896).
147. E.g., Binder v. Weinberg, 94 Miss. 817, 48 So. 1013 (1909); Rennyson's Appeal, 94
Pa. 147 (1880); Depner v. United States Nat'l Bank, 202 Wis. 405, 232 N.W. 851 (1930).
148. Nomar v. Ballard, 134 W. Va. 492, 60 S.E.2d 710 (1950).
149. Blumberg v. Weiss, 129 N.J. Eq. 34, 17 A.2d 823 (1941). The court stated that
generally an implied reservation of a sunlight easement would not be raised since the grant
will be viewed more strongly against the grantor. The court advised grantors who wish to
reserve such an easement to do so by express provision in the deed.
150. Id.; see also Morrison v. Marquardt, 24 Iowa 35 (1868). In that case the court
discussed the problems which would arise under a doctrine permitting implied reservation of
an easement for sunlight, especially in cities.
The vendor sells the land, makes no reservation of any rights therein, parts
with his dominion over it, receives his pay for it, and when his vendee
proposes to build, he stays his hand with an implied reservation, and the
vendee finds that he has made a barren, unprofitable purchase; that he owns
and pays taxes on a lot, to afford the vendor an unobstructed supply of air
and sunlight.
Id. at 65.
151. CALIFORNIA-Kennedy v. Burnap, 120 Cal. 488, 52 P. 843 (1898); ILLINOISBaird v. Hanna, 328 Ill. 436, 159 N.E. 793 (1928); INDIANA-Wolf v. Forcum, 130 Ind.
App. 10, 161 N.E.2d 175 (1959); IOWA-Morrison v. Marquardt, 24 Iowa 35 (1867);
MASSACHUSETTS-Keats v. Hugo, 115 Mass. 204 (1874); Collier v. Pierce, 73 Mass. (7
Gray) 18 (1856); NEVADA-Probasco v. City of Reno, 85 Nev. 563,459 P.2d 772 (1969);
NEW JERSEY-Blumberg v. Weiss, 129 N.J. Eq. 34, 17 A.2d 823 (1941); NEW YORKShipman v. Beers, 2 Abb. N. Cas. 435 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1877); Pica v. Cross County Constr.
Corp., 259 App. Div. 128, 18 N.Y.S.2d 470 (1940); OHIO-Mullen v. Stricker, 19 Ohio St.
135 (1869); PENNSYLVANIA-Haverstick v. Sipe, 33 Pa. 368 (1859); WASHINGTONRoe v. Walsh, 76 Wash. 148, 135 P. 1031 (1913).
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two of which track the major arguments denying prescriptive creation of sunlight easements.' 5 2 One ground is justified by arguing
that the doctrine of implied easement creation is not suited for conditions in the United States; 1 53 a second is justified on the basis that
152. See text accompanying notes 87-99 supra.
153. Many of the cases in which the courts foreclosed implied creation of easements for
sunlight held that such easements were not suitable to the conditions in the United States.
Kennedy v. Burnap, 120 Cal. 488, 52 P. 843 (1898); Baird v. Hanna, 328 111.436, 159 N.E.
793 (1928); Morrison v. Marquardt, 24 Iowa 35 (1868); Keats v. Hugo, 115 Mass. 204
(1874); Blumberg v. Weiss, 129 N.J. Eq. 34, 17 A.2d 823 (1941); Pica v. Cross County
Constr. Corp., 259 App. Div. 128, 18 N.Y.S.2d 470 (1940); Mullen v. Stricker, 19 Ohio St.
135 (1869); Haverstick v. Sipe, 33 Pa. 368 (1859); Roe v. Walsh, 76 Wash. 148, 135 P. 1031
(1913). It was argued that land in the United States was constantly and rapidly appreciating
and continually being subjected to new and more costly forms of improvement. In addition,
land so frequently changed owners that it became much like merchandise. E.g., Mullen v.
Stricker, 19 Ohio St. 135, 144 (1869). Courts argued that the effect of applying implied
easement doctrine to sunlight would be to hinder future development of land, especially in
urban areas. In addition, it would interfere with the free alienation of land. Purchasers of
land would be in danger of suffering from burdens imposed upon their land. E.g., Blumberg
v. Weiss, 129 N.J. Eq. 34, 17 A.2d 823 (1941); Pica v. Cross County Constr. Corp., 259
App. Div. 128, 18 N.Y.S.2d 470 (1940); Haverstick v. Sipe, 33 Pa. 368 (1859); Roe v.
Walsh, 76 Wash. 148, 135 P. 1031 (1913). A court in Pennsylvania described the difficulties
this doctrine's application would bring.
But how can we define an easement for light and airby implication, without
arresting all change in the style of buildings, all enlargement of a man's house
according to the demands of a growing or improving family? A purchaser of
a house in a crowded town never supposes that his neighbour will have a
right to prevent him from changing the form of it according to his taste ....
Haverstick v. Sipe, 33 Pa. 368, 371 (1859).
One court stated that the doctrine was obsolete since it was developed at common law
when land was sparsely settled and community life uncomplicated. Its foundation was the
grant between two parties, not sound public policy reasons. Therefore, the doctrine was
simply unsuited for modern conditions of life in this country. Blumberg v. Weiss, 129 N.J.
Eq. 34,
-,
17 A.2d 823, 826 (1941). The court went on to suggest that comprehensive
community planning and zoning are the present day methods for balancing the needs of the
parties with the needs of the community. Id See generally Eisenstadt and Utton, supra note
10 at 379-413; Reitze, A Solar Rights Zoning Guarantee: Seeking New Law in Old Concepts, 1976 Wash. U.L.Q. 375. These articles discuss the use of planning and zoning as a
means of providing access to sunlight for solar energy collectors.
Note how the language of a prominent jurist, Joseph Story, was used by a court out of
context to lend support to a legal conclusion which is clearly opposed to the law suggested
in Story's opinion. Compare United States v. Appleton, 24 F. Cas. 841 (C.C.D. Mass. 1833)
with Morrison v. Marquardt, 24 Iowa 35 (1868). In Appleton, the issue was whether the
purchaser of a store was entitled to swing a side-door over the piazza of a custom-house and
to pass in and out of his store onto the custom-house street. The court had to determine
what passed implicitly with the grant of the store to the purchaser. In analyzing the implied
use of the door, Story used an example of a sunlight easement created by implication. He
concluded that there was no doubt that the grant of a building carried with it the use of
sunlight through windows; therefore, the grantor could not then build on adjacent land so as
to obstruct those windows. Id at 843. Story then stated, "[Iln the construction of grants
the court ought to take into consideration the circumstances attendant upon the transaction, the particular situation of the parties, the state of the country, and the state of the
thing granted, for the purpose of ascertaining the intention of the parties." Id. In implying a
grant by the seller for the use of the door by the purchaser, Story also drew an analogy to
the use of sunlight. "Could the owners of the central building on the next day after [its
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light and air are somehow different from other types of easements.1 54 One court stated that reasons for denying prescriptive
creation apply with equal strength to the denial of implied creation
of easements for sunlight."' Another court contended that arguments favoring prescriptive creation are stronger than those favoring
implied creation. 1 5 6

A third justification advanced by courts for refusing to extend the
implied easement doctrine to sunlight is that such easements would
result in great uncertainty.' 57 These courts have emphasized that
such easements are contrary to the purpose of the recording acts.
Because the real estate would be encumbered without a recorded
encumbrance in the chain of title, future purchasers would have
difficulty determining whether those easements existed. The risk
transfer] have shut it? Could they have shut out all the light of the window in the upper
part of it? . .. In my opinion it is most clear, that they could not." Id.
The court in Morrison v. Marquardt utilized Story's language regarding the construction
of grants. 24 Iowa at 61. This was the only portion of Story's opinion the Morrison court
utilized. The Morrison court discussed the intolerability and uncertainty which would exist
if courts utilized implied easement analysis to easements for sunlight. The court concluded
that no implied easement existed in the case before it, but the court did not absolutely
foreclose the existence of an implied easement for sunlight in other cases. 24 Iowa 35,61-67.
Although the court in Morrison accurately applied Story's standard for construing grants to
the case before it, its conclusion on the utility of implied easements for sunlight was
contrary to that which was suggested by Story in Appleton. Quoting Justice Story's language on the standard for construing grants suggests a decisional kinship with that great
jurist. The Morrison court erroneously believed that using Story's quotation lent a degree of
credibility, or at least the imprimatur of scholarship, to its opinion.
154. Morrison v. Marquardt, 24 Iowa 35 (1868); Wolf v. Forcum, 130 Ind. App. 10, 161
N.E.2d 175 (1959); Keats v. Hugo, 115 Mass. 204 (1874); Haverstick v. Sipe, 33 Pa. 368
(1859). It is argued that light and air easements are distinguishable from other easements
such as roadways and drains, because light and airuse does not require use of the servient
tenement. Morrison v. Marquardt, 24 Iowa 35, 60 (1868). The court in Keats v. Hugo, 115
Mass. 204 (1874) stated:
By nature, airand light do not flow in definite channels, but are universally
diffused. The supposed necessity for their passage in a particular line or
direction to any lot of land is created not by the relative situation of that lot
to the surrounding lands, but by the manner in which that lot has been built
upon. The actual enjoyment of the airand light by the owner of the house is
upon his own land only.
Id. at 215. The courts were unwilling to imply an easement for sunlight because they felt its
burden on the servient tenant would be too great. For additional discussion of light and air
differences from other easements in the context of prescriptive creation see notes 96-99
supra.
155. Keats v. Hugo, 115 Mass. 204, 215 (1874).
156. Kennedy v. Burnap, 120 Cal. 488, 52 P. 843 (1898).
157. Kennedy v. Burnap, 120 Cal. 488, 52 P. 84.3 (1898); Morrison v. Marquardt, 24
Iowa 35 (1868); Keats v. Hugo, 115 Mass. 204 (1874); Blumberg v. Weiss, 129 N.J. Eq. 34,
17 A.2d 823 (1941); Pica v. Cross County Constr. Corp., 259 App. Div. 128, 18 N.Y.S.2d
470 (1940); Mullen v. Stricker, 19 Ohio St. 135 (1869); Roe v. Walsh, 76 Wash. 148, 135 P.
1031 (1913); Nomar v. Ballard, 134 W. Va. 492, 60 S.E.2d 710 (1950) (dissenting opinion).
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would thus fall on the purchaser because there would be no way to
make the title to the real estate certain.1 '8 Litigation would be
promoted as a result.' 9 One court' 6 0 summarized the rationale
against implied easements for sunlight by stating that a purchaser of
real property has the right to assume that no easements burden the
property other than those which appeared on the record and those
which were apparent from observation of the land. An implied easement for sunlight would not be of record. Nor, it was argued, would
such an easement be apparent from observing a neighboring house
with windows overlooking the land.' 6 I If such a burden were contemplated it should be expressly created.' 6 2
A number of cases have, however, implied the existence of easements for sunlight.' 63 These cases tend to form a scale from beneficially necessary 61 to strictly necessary,' 6 5 with a suggestion in
some cases that even the strictest necessity may not be enough.' 6 6 A
finding of presumed intent in the parties' transaction was the key to
inclusion of the easement rights in the conveyance.
In finding implied easements for sunlight, one group of cases utilized a "reasonably necessary for beneficial enjoyment" test similar
158. Kennedy v. Burnap, 120 Cal. 488,
-,
52 P. 843, 844 (1898); Morrison v.
Marquardt, 24 Iowa 35, 64 (1868); Blumberg v. Weiss 129 N.J. Eq. 34,
-, 17 A.2d 823,
826 (1941); Roe v. Walsh, 76 Wash. 148, -,
135 P. 1031, 1034 (1913); Nomar v.
Ballard, 134 W. Va. 492,
-, 60 S.E.2d 710, 721 (1950) (dissenting opinion).
159. Kennedy v. Burnap, 120 Cal. 488,
-, 52 P. 843, 844 (1898); Mullen v. Stricker,
19 Ohio St. 135, 144 (1869); Keats v. Hugo, 115 Mass. 204, 215-16 (1874); Roe v. Walsh,
76 Wash. 148,
-,
135 P. 1031, 1034 (1913).
160. Roe v. Walsh, 76 Wash. 148, 135 P. 1031 (1913).
161. Id. at
, 135 P. at 1034.
162. Kennedy v. Burnap, 120 Cal. 488, 52 P. 843 (1898); Keats v. Hugo, 115 Mass. 204
(1874); Mullen v. Stricker, 19 Ohio St. 135 (1869).
163. United States v. Appleton, 24 F. Cas. 841 (C.C.D. Mass. 1833) (dicta) (Story, J.).
CONNECTICUT-Robinson v, Clapp, 65 Conn. 365, 32 A. 939 (1895); GEORGIA-S. A.
Lynch Corp. v. Stone, 211 Ga. 516, 87 S.E.2d 57 (1955);Turner v. Thompson, 58 Ga. 268
(1877); LOUISIANA-Taylor v. Boulware, 35 La. Ann. 469 (1883); MARYLAND-Lane v.
Flautt, 176 Md. 620, 6 A.2d 228 (1939); Janes v. Jenkins, 34 Md. 1 (1871); MASSACHUSETTS-Case v. Minot, 158 Mass. 577, 33 N.E. 700 (1893); MINNESOTA-Highway 7
Embers, Inc. v. Northwestern Nat'l Bank,
- Minn. -,
256 N.W.2d 271 (1977);
MISSISSIPPI-Binder v. Weinberg, 94 Miss. 817, 48 So. 1013 (1909); NEW JERSEY-Engel
v. Siderides, 112 N.J. Eq. 431, 164 A. 397 (1933); Liedtke v. Lipman, 76 A. 463 (N.J. Ch.
1910); Fowler v. Wick, 74 N.J. Eq. 603, 70 A. 682 (Ch. 1908); Bloom v. Koch, 63 N.J. Eq.
10, 50 A. 621 (Ch. 1901); Greer v. Van Meter, 54 N.J. Eq. 270, 33 A. 794 (Ch. 1896);
Sutphen v. Therkelson, 38 N.J. Eq. 318 (Ch. 1884); Hayden v. Dutcher, 31 N.J. Eq. 217
(Ch. 1879); PENNSYLVANIA-Maioriello v. Arlotta, 364 Pa. 557, 73 A.2d 374 (1950);
Rennyson's Appeal, 94 Pa. 147 (1880); WEST VIRGINIA-Nomar v. Ballard, 134 W. Va.
492, 60 S.E.2d 710 (1950); Powell v. Sims, 5 W. Va. 1 (1871); WISCONSIN-Depner v.
United States Nat'l Bank, 202 Wis. 405, 232 N.W. 851 (1930).
164. See cases cited note 146 supra.
165. See cases cited note 147 supra.
166. See case cited note 148 supra.
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to that used in affirmative implied easement cases. 1 6 7 The courts
made no distinction between tangible and intangible uses of the servient property. 1 6 8 They tended to analyze the equities of the transaction. One basis for analysis was the theory that the grantor shall
not derogate from his grant." 69 This maxim usually appeared in
cases where a grantor divided his real property by transferring a
home located on a portion of it. Later, the same grantor built upon
the remaining parcel, effectively blocking sunlight to the grantee's
windows. Such action was deemed unfair to the grantee, who at the
time of the conveyance relied upon continued sunlight into the
home.
A second analysis was based on the theory that a grantor's conveyance carries with it all that is reasonably necessary for its enjoyment. 1 70 Courts held that sunlight benefits enjoyed by the grantor
passed to his grantee if the sunlight was reasonably necessary for
enjoyment of the property conveyed. One court 1 71 stated the standard developed by this second line of cases.
[W] here one who is the owner of two adjoining lots of land, on one
of which is a house with an apparent and continuous right of light
and air through windows therein, over the other lot, conveys away
the former lot, retaining the latter, there is in the absence of any
express provision to the contrary, an implied grant by him of the
right to the light and air which have been enjoyed through the
windows over the other property, and he cannot derogate from his
own grant, by building on such other property so as to obstruct or
167. S. A. Lynch Corp. v. Stone, 211 Ga. 516, 87 S.E.2d 57 (1955); Janes v. Jenkins, 34
Md. 1 (1871); Case v. Minot, 158 Mass. 577, 33 N.E. 700 (1893); Liedtke v. Lipman, 76 A.
463 (N.J. Ch. 1910); Fowler v. Wick, 74 N.J. Eq. 603, 70 A. 682 (Ch. 1908); Greer v. Van
Meter, 54 N.J. Eq. 270, 33 A. 794 (Ch. 1896); Sutphen v. Therkelson, 38 N.J. Eq. 318 (Ch.
1884); Hayden v. Dutcher, 31 N.J. Eq. 217 (Ch. 1879).
168. Compare the general doctrines announced in Liedtke v. Lipman, 76 A. 463 (N.J.
Ch. 1910) for creation of an implied easement for sunlight with United States v. Appleton,
24 F. Cas. 841 (C.C.D. Mass. 1833) where then Judge Story stated the general rule for the
creation of an implied easement. In discussing the easement of sunlight, the court in Liedtke
v. Lipman said, "[it] may be claimed where at the time of the conveyance it was continuous, apparent, and reasonably necessary to the beneficial enjoyment of the estate for
which it is claimed, and that in such a grant of such easement, would be implied." Liedtke,
76 A. at 464. In discussing implied easements generally, Judge Story wrote:
The general rule of law is that when a house or store is conveyed by the
owner thereof, every thing then belonging to, and in use for, the house or
store, as an incident or appurtenance, passes by the grant. It is implied from
the nature of the grant, unless it contains some restriction, that the grantee
shall possess the house in the manner, and with the same beneficial rights, as
were then in use and belonged to it.
Appleton, 24 F. Cas. at 843.
169. E.g., Hayden v. Dutcher, 31 N.J. Eq. 217, 219 (Ch. 1879).
170. Id.
171. Sutphen v. Therkelson, 38 N.J. Eq. 318 (Ch. 1884).
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materially interfere
with the enjoyment of light and air through
1
those windows. 72

If the use of sunlight is visible, open and apparent as it crosses the
retained portion of a tract, then courts have inferred that the parties
entered into the transaction with reference to the sunlight and the
price was set accordingly.'7 The courts have held, however, that
this inference exists only for windows in place at the time of the
transaction. If the building or home was remodeled, only windows

occupying the same space as those in existence at the time of the
conveyance would retain the implied easement for sunlight.' 7' If
the building was demolished, the necessity and the implied easement

of sunlight were extinguished with it.' 71 This limitation tempered
the rationale that such an easement would greatly burden land and
hinder its development, which was advanced by courts in opposition

to implied easements for sunlight.
Some cases required a much greater necessity before a sunlight
easement could be created by implication.' 76 These courts refused
to imply sunlight easements if substitute or alternative forms of illumination were available at a reasonable cost.' 7 7 They held that the

easement must be so obvious and apparent to the servient tenant that
he could be charged with knowledge that the courts would forbid
him from using his land in a way that would obstruct the sunlight."' One court' 7' stated:
172. Id at 321.
173. E.g., Janes v. Jenkins, 34 Md. 1, 7-8 (1871); Liedtke v. Lipman, 76 A. 463, 464
(N.J. Ch. 1910). In Greer v. Van Meter, 54 N.J. Eq. 270, 33 A. 794 (Ch. 1896), the court's
reasonable convenience test was stated as:
[WIhether the presence of the window was so useful to the store and the
business conducted therein that it is reasonable to assume that its continued
presence was in the mind of the parties, and influenced the purchaser in
arriving at the amount of the consideration paid at the time of the interchange of the properties.
Id at
, 33 A. at 795.
174. E.g., Fowler v. Wick, 74 N.J. Eq. 603,-.,
70 A. 682, 683 (Ch. 1908).
175. E.g., S. A. Lynch Corp. v. Stone, 211 Ga. 516,
-, 87 S.E.2d 57, 62 (1955).
176. Robinson v. Clapp, 65 Conn. 365, 32 A. 939 (1895); Turner v. Thompson, 58 Ga.
268 (1877); Binder v. Weinberg, 94 Miss. 817, 48 So. 1013 (1909); Maioriello v. Arlotta,
364 Pa. 557, 73 A.2d 374 (1950); Rennyson's Appeal, 94 Pa. 147 (1880); Nomar v. Ballard,
134 W. Va. 492, 60 S.E.2d 710 (1950); Powell v. Sims, 5 W. Va. 1 (1871); Depner v. United
States Nat'l Bank, 202 Wis. 405, 232 N.W. 851 (1930).
177. E.g., Powell v. Sims, 5 W. Va. 1, 7-8 (1871); see Turner v. Thompson, 58 Ga. 268,
274 (1877). The court in Turner granted a new trial in order that questions on the availability of reasonably priced sunlight alternatives could be considered by the jury. Id. See
also Binder v. Weinberg, 94 Miss. 817, 48 So. 1013 (1909); Maioriello v. Arlotta, 364 Pa.
557,
-, 73 A.2d 374, 376 (1950); Rennyson's Appeal, 94 Pa. 147, 153 (1880).
178. Robinson v. Clapp, 65 Conn. 365,-,
32A. 939, 944 (1895); Nomar v. Ballard,
134 W. Va. 492, _,
60 S.E.2d 710, 715 (1950); Depner v. United States Nat'l Bank, 202
Wis. 405,
, 232 N.W. 851, 852 (1930).
179. Depner v. United States Nat'l Bank, 202 Wis. 405, 232 N.W. 851 (1930).
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Necessity must be so clear and absolute that without the easement
the grantee cannot in any reasonable sense be said to have acquired
that which is expressly granted; such indeed as inconceivable that
the parties could have dealt in the matter without both intending
that the easement be conferred 80

These strict necessity cases can be subdivided. Some imposed a
"clear necessity" standard, while others required that it be "inconceivable that the parties dealt without intending to include the easement." 1 8 Under each standard the immediate transaction was analyzed, but different tests of strict necessity were imposed. These
standards required the court to analyze the facts and circumstances
existing at the time of the transaction using different levels of "need
for sunlight" access. Some courts emphasized the parties' specific
transaction and the hardship which would go unredressed if the easement was not implied.'82 Other courts were unwilling to abandon
traditional implied easement analysis in the absence of legislative enactment.'

3

Light and Air Easements Created by Implication
over Streets and in Leases

Courts have frequently implied sunlight easements for the benefit
of property which abuts streets. 84 The easement for sunlight would
cover an area over and across the street. It would not be created
through judicial construction of a severance of real property, but
would be implied from the location of the property. An abutter's
easement of sunlight was first fully articulated in an 1856 New Jersey case.'

8

I The court concluded that a street abutter's right to light

180. Id. at -, 232 N.W. at 852 (emphasis added).
181. See cases cited in notes 175-79 supra.
182. E.g., Sutphen v. Therkelson, 38 N.J. Eq. 318, 323 (Ch. 1884).
183. E.g., Id.; Engel v. Siderides, 112 N.J. Eq. 431, 164 A. 397 (1933).
184. Muhlker v. Harlem R.R., 197 U.S. 544 (1905); Short Line Assocs. v. City & County
of San Francisco, 78 Cal. App. 3d 50, 143 Cal. Rptr. 921 (1978); Selden v. City of
Jacksonville, 28 Fla. 558, 10 So. 457 (1891); Adams v. Chicago, B. & N.R. Co., 39 Minn.
286, 39 N.W. 629 (1888); Rourke v. Holmes St. Ry., 221 Mo. 46, 119 S.W. 1094 (1909);
Morton v. State, 104 N.H. 34, 181 A.2d 831 (1962); Dill v. School Bd., 47 N.J. Eq. 421,
20 A. 739 (Ch. 1890); Barnett v. Johnson, 15 N.J. Eq. 481 (1856); St. Peter's Italian
Church v. State, 261 App. Div. 96, 24 N.Y.S.2d 759 (1941); Lee v. Pruyn Lumber & Supply
Co., 102 Misc. 455, 169 N.Y.S. 903 (Sup. Ct. 1918); Rothschild v. Interborough Rapid
Transit Co., 162'App. Div. 532, 147 N.Y.S. 1040 (1914); Kane v. Metropolitan El. Ry., 125
N.Y. 164, 26 N.E. 278 (1891); Peyser v. Metropolitan Elevated Ry., 12 Abb. N. Cas. 276
(N.Y. Com. Pleas 1883); Village of Port Clinton v. Fall, 99 Ohio St. 153, 124 N.E. 189
(1919); Wall v. Eisenstadt, 51 R.I. 339, 154 A. 651 (1931); Fort Worth & D.C. Ry. v. Ayers,
-, 526 P.2d
-Utah
149 S.W. 1068 (Tex. Ct. App. 1912); Road Comm'n v. Miya,
926 (1974); Shield v. Peninsula Land Co., 147 Va. 736, 133 S.E. 586 (1926).
185. Barnett v. Johnson, 15 N.J. Eq. 481 (1856). The court dubbed the right to light and
airexisting on behalf of street abutters the "right of adjacency." Id. at 487.
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was essential to the existence of cities,' 86 and that it was a right
grounded in the strictest necessity of the abutting property
owner.' 87

Much like the traditional implied easements construed by the
courts from a severance of real property,' 88 street abutters' rights
are created the moment a community dedicates a street. Strict necessity and fairness to the abutter are mentioned by courts which have
found in favor of this easement.
The "strict necessity" analysis which includes both the city and
the individual property owner is distinguished by the courts from the
traditional implied easement situation, where strict necessity is analyzed only on behalf of the party claiming benefit of the easement.
Some courts emphasize the importance of the easements to the city
in providing light and air,' "9 as well as to the individual street abutter.' 90 In addition, some courts argued that abutting landowners paid
for the street by being assessed for benefits which the opening of the
street conferred upon their property. Having paid for the streets, the
courts reasoned, abutters should be entitled to enjoy them,' 9 as
well as the light and air which fall over and across the street. One
court' 92 summarized the existence of the abutter's easement rights
as follows:
It is a right founded in such an urgent necessity that all laws and
legal proceedings take it for granted. A right so strong that it protects itself, so urgent that, upon any attempt to annul or infringe it,
it would set at defiance all legislative enactment and all judicial

decision. 193

186. Id. at 488. In reaching this conclusion the court said:
Men do not first build cities, and then lay out roads through them, but they
first lay out roads, and then cities spring up along their lines. As a matter of
fact and history, have not all villages, towns, and cities in this country and in
all others, now and at all times past, been built up upon this assumed right of
adjacency? Is not every window and every door in every house in every city,
town, and village the assertion and maintenance of this right?
Id
187. Id. at 489. See also Kane v. Metropolitan Elevated Ry., 125 N.Y. 164, 26 N.E. 278
(1891).
188. See note 143 supra.
189. Muhlker v. Harlem R.R., 197 U.S. 544 (1905); Adams v. Chicago, B. & N.R.R., 39
Minn. 286, 39 N.W. 629 (1888); Barnett v. Johnson, 15 N.J. Eq. 481 (1856).
190. Muhlker v. Harlem R.R., 197 U.S. 544 (1905); Selden v. City of Jacksonville, 28
Fla. 558, 10 So. 457 (1891); Barnett v. Johnson, 15 N.J. Eq. 481 (1856).
191. Selden v. City of Jacksonville, 28 Fla. 558, 10 So. 457 (1891); Adams v. Chicago B.
& N.R.R., 39 Minn. 286, 39 N.W. 629 (1888); Peyser v. Metropolitan Elevated Ry., 12
Abb. N. Cas. 276 (N.Y. Com. Pleas 1883).
192. Barnett v. Johnson, 15 N.J. Eq. 481 (1856).
193. Id. at 489.
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There was controversy involved in finding the necessity of an abutter's easement. Holmes, dissenting in Muhlker v. Harlem Railroad,I'9
did not believe that abutters' rights were necessary for the city and
the property owner. Instead, he termed the doctrine a novelty in
legal authority' ' and stated that "[i] f at the outset the New York
courts had decided that apart from statute or express grant the abutters on a street had only the rights of the public and no private
easement of any kind, it would have been in no way amazing."' 96
Landlord and tenant cases involving implied easements for sunlight
have also been reported. One group of cases allowed creation of
implied easements for sunlight in lease situations.' 97 These cases
construed the creation of the tenancy to include an easement for
light appurtenant or incident to the leased premises.' 9 8 The analysis
focused on the necessity of the sunlight easement to the beneficial
enjoyment of the property.' 9 9 This type of analysis, a search for
"fairness," is similar to that which was employed by the judiciary in
grant situations concerning implied easements for sunlight.2 0 0 Mere
convenience of sunlight to the claimant was not enough. A reason-

194. 197 U.S. 544, 571 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
195. Holmes reached this conclusion saying, "The doctrine that abutters upon a highway have an easement of light and air is stated as a novelty in point of authority in Barnett
v. Johnson, 15 N.J. Eq. 481, 489 [(1856)] and that case was decided in a state where it was
held that a like right might be acquired by prescription. Robeson v. Pittenger, 1 Green Ch.
57."Id. at 573.
196. Id at 572-73.
197. Clark v. Mountain States Life Ins. Co., 1 Cal. App. 2d 301, 36 P.2d 848 (1934);
Darnell v. Columbus Show Case Co., 129 Ga. 62, 58 S.E. 631 (1907); Hampe v. Elia, 251
Mass. 465, 146 N.E. 730 (1925); Tomburo v. Liberty Freehold Theatre Corp., 131 N.J. Eq.
513, 25 A.2d 909 (1942); Ware v. Chew, 43 N.J. Eq. 493, 11 A.746 (Ch. 1887);Aliber v.
Remsen St. Co., 31 Misc. 2d 786, 221 N.Y.S.2d 464 (Sup. Ct. 1961); Leventhal v.
Straus, 197 Misc. 798, 95 N.Y.S.2d 883 (N.Y.C. Mun. Ct. 1950); Sturner v. Delaware
Properties, Inc., 135 Misc. 514, 239 N.Y.S. 52 (Sup. Ct. 1930); Bauer v. Schwartz, 122
Misc. 630, 203 N.Y.S. 507, aff'd, 209 App. Div. 827, 204 N.Y.S. 893, aff'd, 211 App. Div.
810, 206 N.Y.S. 883 (Sup. Ct. 1924); O'Neill v. Breese, 3 Misc. 219, 23 N.Y.S. 526 (Sup.
Ct. 1893); Spies v. Damm, 54 How. Pr. 293 (N.Y. Super. Ct. 1877); Doyle v. Lord, 64 N.Y.
432 (1876).
198. Clark v. Mountain States Life Ins. Co., 1 Cal. App. 2d 301, 36 P.2d 848 (1934);
Leventhal v. Straus, 197 Misc. 798, 95 N.Y.S.2d 883 (N.Y.C. Mun. Ct. 1950); Bauer v.
Schwartz, 122 Misc. 630, 203 N.Y.S. 507, aff'd, 209 App. Div. 827, 204 N.Y.S. 893,aff'd,
211 App. Div. 810, 206 N.Y.S. 883 (Sup. Ct. 1924); O'Neill v. Breese, 3 Misc. 219, 23
N.Y.S. 526 (Super. Ct. 1893); Spies v. Damm, 54 How. Pr. 293 (N.Y. Super. Ct. 1877);
Doyle v. Lord, 64 N.Y. 432 (1876).
199. E.g., Darnell v. Columbus Show Case Co., 129 Ga. 62, 58 S.E. 631 (1907); Leventhai v. Straus, 197 Misc. 798, 95 N.Y.S.2d 883 (N.Y.C. Mun. Ct. 1950); Sturner v. Delaware
Properties, Inc., 135 Misc. 514, 239 N.Y.S. 52 (Sup. Ct. 1930).
200. See text accompanying notes 163-83 supra.
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able necessity 2 0 1 and, in at least one instance, strict necessity 2 0 2 for
the enjoyment of the leased premises was required. The two lines of
leasehold cases-one focusing on public policy considerations, the
other on the specific transaction-are similar to the implied-easementin-grant cases. 2 0 3
Some courts found additional justifications for implying an easement for sunlight in a leasehold. 2 04 One such justification was that
if the implied easement for light did not exist and the lessee's sunlight could be obstructed by the lessor, then the leased premises
would become untenantable. This would result in either an actual or
constructive eviction of the lessee.2 0 The lessor would be disturbing
the tenancy he created with the lessee by obstructing the flow of
sunlight to the lessee's premises. This concept was expanded by holding that the lessee is entitled to use the premises in the condition
which existed at the time of the transaction. The lessor could therefore not alter the premises in such a way as to make it unfit for use
without the consent of the lessee. 0 6 The justification for implying
an easement for sunlight in leases is similar to an argument developed
201. Darnell v. Columbus Show Case Co., 129 Ga. 62, 58 S.E. 631 (1907); Leventhal v.
Straus, 197 Misc. 798, 95 N.Y.S.2d 883 (N.Y.C. Mun. Ct. 1950); Sturner v. Delaware
Properties, Inc., 135 Misc. 514, 239 N.Y.S. 52 (Sup. Ct. 1930). See also Spies v. Damm, 54
How. Pr. 293 (N.Y. Super. Ct. 1877); Doyle v. Lord, 64 N.Y. 432 (1876).
202. Hampe v. Elia, 251 Mass. 465, 146 N.E. 730 (1925). See also Clark v. Mountain
States Life Ins. Co., 1 Cal. App. 2d 301, 36 P.2d 848 (1934); Aliber v. Remsen St. Co.,
31 Misc. 2d 786, 221 N.Y.S.2d 464 (Sup. Ct. 1961);Bauer v. Schwartz, 122 Misc. 630, 203
N.Y.S. 507, aff'd, 209 App. Div. 827, 204 N.Y.S. 893, aff'd, 211 App. Div. 810, 206 N.Y.S.
883 (Sup. Ct. 1924).
203. See text accompanying notes 151-83 supra.
204. Clark v. Mountain States Life Ins. Co., 1 Cal. App. 2d 301, 36 P.2d 848 (1934);
Darnell v. Columbus Show Case Co., 129 Ga. 62, 58 S.E. 631 (1907); Tomburo v. Liberty
Freehold Theatre Corp., 131 N.J. Eq. 513, 25 A.2d 909 (1942); Aliber V. Remsen St.
Co., 31 Misc. 2d 786, 221 N.Y.S.2d 464 (Sup. Ct. 1961); Leventhal v. Straus, 197 Misc.
798, 95 N.Y.S.2d 883 (N.Y.C. Mun. Ct. 1950); See also Bauer v. Schwartz, 122 Misc. 630,
203 N.Y.S. 507, aff'd, 209 App. Div. 827, 204 N.Y.S. 893, aff'd, 211 App. Div. 810, 206
N.Y.S. 883 (Sup. Ct. 1924).
205. Clark v. Mountain States Life Ins. Co., 1 Cal. App. 2d 301, 36 P.2d 848 (1934). See
also Aliber v. Remsen St. Co., 31 Misc. 2d 786, 221 N.Y.S.2d 464 (Sup. Ct. 1961); Bauer
v. Schwartz, 122 Misc. 630, 203 N.Y.S. 507, aff'd, 209 App. Div. 827, 204 N.Y.S. 893,
affl'd, 211 App. Div. 810, 206 N.Y.S. 883 (Sup. Ct. 1924).
206. Darnell v. Columbus Show Case Co., 129 Ga. 62, 58 S.E. 631 (1907); Leventhal v.
Straus, 197 Misc. 798, 95 N.Y.S.2d 883 (N.Y.C. Mun. Ct. 1950). See also Tomburo v.
Liberty Freehold Theatre Corp., 131 N.J. Eq. 513, 25 A.2d 909 (1942), where the court
distinguishes implied easements for sunlight in a leasehold of a home from a leasehold of a
business. The deprivation of light in a home must be substantial so as to render the home
uncomfortable for occupation according to the ordinary notions of mankind. The deprivation of Light in a business must be such as to prevent the easement claimant from carrying
on his business as beneficially as before. Id at
-, 25 A.2d at 910.
The implied right to unobstructed sunlight was construed as a balance between reasonable
use of the adjoining premises by the lessor and the degree of obstruction of the lessee's
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in implying easements for light in grants: the grantor may not derogate from his grant. 2

07

Another group of cases rejected the doctrine of implied easements
for sunlight. 2 0 8 In so doing, these courts saw no distinction between
the effects of implied easements for sunlight in lease situations and in
grant situations. The courts argued that implying such an easement
would greatly embarrass estates, promote litigation and be unsuited
to conditions in the United States. 2 0' According to these cases,
drafted in order to provide for sunexpress terms would have to be
2
light easements in a leasehold. 1 0
Courts which have provided for implied creation of sunlight easements by lease or grant seemed to focus on the equities of the
transaction. Courts which denied the creation of these easements
emphasized the public policy effects of implied creation of such
easements. A few courts 2 1I did, however, imply sunlight easements
but, in so doing, looked beyond the specific transaction and recognized important public policy problems. 2 12 These courts advised
caution in applying implied easement doctrine to sunlight easements;21 1 one court stated that even where clear necessity is shown,
implication of the easement should not be allowed to impede improvements or community development. 2 14 In effect, the courts
sunlight. See also text accompanying and within notes 120-27 for a discussion of trade offs
between the solar energy user and his neighbor.
207. See text accompanying note 169 supra.
208. Anderson v. Bloomheart, 101 Kan. 691, 168 P. 900 (1917); Joseph v. Lidsky, 34
Misc. 2d 606, 226 N.Y.S.2d 636 (N.Y.C. Mun. Ct. 1962); Mannino v. Conoco Realty Corp.,
, 86 N.Y.S.2d 855 (Sup. Ct. 1949); Myers v. Gemmel, 10 Barb. 537 (N.Y.
__
Misc.
Sup. Ct. 1851); Palmer v. Wetmore, 2 Sand. 316 (N.y. Super. Ct. 1849).
209. E.g., Anderson v. Bloomheart, 101 Kan. 691, 168 P. 900 (1917). See also Myers v.
Gemmel, 10 Barb. 537 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1851). See text accompanying notes 151-62 supra for
a discussion of the perceived negative effects of implying an easement for sunlight in a grant
situation.
210. Anderson v. Bloomheart, 101 Kan. 691, 168 P. 900 _(1917); Joseph v. Lidsky, 34
Misc. 2d 606, 226 N.Y.S.2d 636 (N.Y.C. Mun. Ct. 1962); Mannino v. Conoco Realty Corp.,
, 86 N.Y.S.2d 855 (Sup. Ct. 1949).
__ Misc. 211. Robinson v. Clapp 65 Conn. 365, 32 A. 939 (1895); Rennyson's Appeal, 94 Pa. 147
(1880); Nomar v. Ballard, 134 W. Va. 492, 60 S.E.2d 710 (1950).
212. See text accompanying and within notes 182-99 supra Rennyson's Appeal 94 Pa.
147 (1880) held:
Public policy requires that in a new and developing country, the spirit of
improvements or betterments should not be chained and handicapped by the
law. With the limitation of an implication arising from real and actual necessity, the time honored and equitable maxim of sic utere tuo non alienum
loedas, is carefully reserved .... [Otherwise] ... [al improvements would
be stayed, values would be destroyed, and alienations, except under special
contracts, rendered dangerous for the future and ruinous in the past.
Id. at 154.
, 32 A. 939, 945 (1895).
213. E.g., Robinson v. Clapp, 65 Conn. 365,
-, 60 S.E.2d 710, 719 (1950).
214. Nomar v. Ballard, 134 W. Va. 492,
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balanced the concept of "fairness" between parties against the probable effects on the development of the community. 2 1 5
Solar Access Easements Created by Implication
A compelling case could be made for applying an implied easement analysis where the requested access is to sunlight for an individual's solar energy collector. Several cases previously discussed provide
a basis for such an analysis. 2 1 6 An issue arises when a single tract of
land is divided, one portion of which utilizes the flow of sunlight
across the other as fuel for its solar energy system. First, it seems
clear that the solar collector must exist prior to the severance of the
tract of land. In "sunlight for illumination" cases, courts would find
an implied easement only for windows (or their approximate location) existing at the time of the transaction. 2 1 7 Second, the easement claimant must have an already existing solar collector which is
threatened with obstruction after the transaction. It is doubtful that
courts which refused to extend an implied easement for sunlight to
newly installed windows would create an easement for a solar collector installed after the conveyance. In addition, a number of cases
have also held that the existence of the implied easement must2 be
obvious and clear to the parties at the time of the transaction. , 8
The existence of solar collector panels collecting sunlight across the
soon-to-be-severed portion of the tract would surely meet this test.
One case 2 1 9 used the "inconceivable" test 2 2 0 in analyzing the
parties' transaction. An argument can at least be made that it is
inconceivable to assume that the purchaser of a building containing
solar panels would have participated in the transaction had he known
the solar energy system might be rendered useless by the other party
soon thereafter. Furthermore, it could probably be shown that the
solar collector and its intended use by the purchaser figured into
computation of the purchase price, much like a furnace, air conditioner or similar energy system already installed in a home.
Countervailing public policy considerations do exist and the courts
will continue to raise these considerations where necessary. Easements which hinder improvement of land, community development,
or the certainty of real estate titles are likely to be questioned. 2 1
215. Id.
216. See cases cited in notes 167-85 supra.
217. See text accompanying and cases cited in notes 174-75 supra.
218. See text accompanying and cases cited in notes 178-80 supra.
219. Depner v. United States Nat'l Bank, 202 Wis. 405, 232 N.W. 851 (1930). See also
text accompanying notes 178-81 supra.
220. See cases cited in notes 181-83 supra.
221. See text accompanying and within notes 179-80 supra.
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Any implied easement for sunlight might have at least some of these
effects, whether used for solar power or for illumination. There is,
however, a countervailing public policy favoring sunlight easements
for solar energy collectors because of the need for energy fuel alternatives. The unfavorable policy analysis may thus be somewhat mitigated when considering solar collectors. The "uncertainty of titles"
arguments against sunlight easements were based upon the fact that
neither the recording system nor observation of the property would
alert a purchaser to the easement's existence . 2 2 2 The existence of
solar collector panels attached to a house or building should, however, convey notice that uninterrupted flow of sunlight to the panel
is required. Observation should lead to a conclusion that a right of
unobstructed flow must exist; otherwise the investment in solar
panels would hinge upon the future development of the soon-to-be
severed tract of land.
Not all development and use of the servient tenement need be
hindered by the easement. The solar collector may be moved to get
an alternative flow of sunlight. As in some cases concerning sunlight
through windows, an. easement will not be implied if sunlight can be
obtained through alternative means at a reasonable cost, 2 2 3 or if
necessity for the easement is not great.2 24 Courts may also be unwilling to rescue a party from a poorly drafted transaction unless
2 2
hardship to that party would follow. s
A major practical problem still exists if favorable implied easement
analysis is expected to encourage widespread use of individual solar
collectors. The doctrine requires preexistence of a solar collector on
the premises claiming the easement. Although the implied easement
doctrine might accomodate solar access easements, practical limitations would make use of the implied sunlight easement doctrine
rather limited.
CONCLUSION
Courts have uniformly upheld express creation of sunlight and air
222. See text accompanying and within notes 157-62 supra.
223. See text accompanying and cases cited in note 177 supra. The solar energy user
should be denied the implied easement if use of conventional energy sources could be had at
a reasonable cost. For example, if only a relatively small portion of annual energy use was
obtained from the sun (perhaps the system had been installed as a hobby or perhaps it had
never performed as expected), then it would seem fair to refuse to imply the easement. The
user could have provided for such in the deed and the harm to the other party in his use of
the land with the encumbrance would add a strong countervailing policy argument, reinforcing the positions taken by courts who refuse to imply easements for sunlight.
224. See text and cases cited in notes 170-72 supra.
225. Such a hardship might include either a huge increase in utility costs or a loss of
energy for the building with no substitute, which would suggest a real necessity for implying
the easement.
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easements; the cases remain good precedent for upholding and enforcing express creation of solar access easements. However, this
method of creation will not encourage solar power use because the
rights may be very expensive or impossible to obtain. Difficulty in
drafting an adequate description of the easement presents further
legal problems.
Prescriptive creation of sunlight and air easements has been uniformly rejected by the courts since the early 20th century; easements
by prescription were judged not to be appropriate to the land development conditions existing in the United States. However, some prescriptive easement cases contained a suggestion that the doctrine
might be applicable for solar access protection under certain conditions. The need to encourage development and use of alternative
energy sources in this country might well be a strong countervailing
policy. Yet even if available for solar access easements, prescriptive
creation might not encourage solar power use due to the required
prescriptive waiting period. Solar power users still need to acquire a
guaranteed access to sunlight prior to making the initial investment
in the solar energy system.
The courts are divided on the issue of implied creation of light and
air easements: the cases which have applied the doctrine seem to
focus on the conveyance to which the easement applies; the courts
which have refused to apply the doctrine focused on public policy
reasons similar to those advanced by courts which refused to allow
prescriptive creation of those same easements. Though the decisions
are not uniform, implied easements for solar access might be upheld
because the existence of a solar collection system in a home or
building would be persuasive evidence of intent. A strong public
policy in favor of the development of alternative energy sources
might also serve to override traditional objections. This method of
creation would, however, occur in relatively few situations and
would not necessarily encourage use of solar power.
Express or implied easements may be utilized to protect a solar
energy user's access to sunlight. Without such a legally recognized
right, the solar energy user has little assurance that his neighbor will
not obstruct the sunlight. If no right can be found, the sunlight user
has no enforceable interest.2 2 6 A recent case, FontainebleauHotel
226. E.g., Ash v. Tate, 73 F.2d 518 (D.C. Cir. 1934). This case is an example of a
compelling fact situation where the user of light, air and view was unable to prevail. The
parties' homes were eighteen inches apart. The plaintiff's home contained a window which
permitted a view across the porch of the defendant. The plaintiff was a semi-invalid. One of
his principal means of recreation was to sit at the aforementioned window and enjoy the
view from it. The defendant installed slotted screens on his porch which when closed
obstructed the plaintiff's light, air and view through the window. The court held that in

168 .
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Corp. v. Forty-Five Twenty-Five, Inc.,2 27 emphasized the harsh consequences awaiting a sunlight user who failed to obtain the legal right
to the sunlight collection. The Fontainebleau and the Eden Roc were
adjoining luxury hotels facing the Atlantic Ocean. The Fountainebleau began construction of a fourteen story addition near its lot
line. When completed, the addition would have shaded the Eden
Roc's cabana, swimming pool and sunbathing areas after 2:00 p.m.
during the winter season. The Eden Roc sought to have this construction enjoined. A problem arose in defining the nature of the legal
right which was being infringed by the Fontainebleau. The court held
that in absence of a contract or a statute granting rights to light and
air, the Eden Roc had no legal right to the sunlight or airflow across
its neighbor's property. 2 2 8 The Eden Roc had neither statutory nor
contract rights to the sunlight.
It is thus essential for the solar power user to secure legal rights to
his source of fuel. Easement doctrines might be of benefit; yet other
property law concepts could also assist in providing these legal rights.
It will be important to advance many legal concepts to parallel new
technology in the development of solar energy.

absence of a statute or covenant which provided the plaintiff with rights of light and air, the
injunction which he had sought would not be granted. In general, no cause of action could
be maintained under such circumstances. See also Fontainebleau Hotel Corp. v. Forty-Five
Twenty-Five, Inc., 114 So. 2d 357 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1959).
227. 114 So. 2d 357 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1959).
228. Icl at 359.

